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I. INTRODUCTION
Forum selection clauses are increasingly common in interstate commercial and consumer contracts. Motivated by the need for certainty, parties to such agreements often include a clause designating the forum to
hear any disputes which may arise out of the construction or operation of
the contract. The parties may agree that such disputes will only be heard
in the courts of a specific jurisdiction.' Alternatively, the parties may

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., 1968, University of Michigan; J.D.. 1971,
University of Wisconsin; LL.M., 1978, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Lisa
D'Errico. Michael C. Ford, Jerry R. Polansky, and Roanne Shamsky for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, Ill S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1991) ("It is agreed by and
between [the contracting parties] that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection
361
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agree that all disputes must be resolved by arbitration as opposed to any
judicial system.2 Regardless of which type of forum the parties may designate, they often also specify the law to be applied by the designated
forum in resolving contract disputes.3 These provisions serve to contrac-

with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State
of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country."). Some contracts even
mandate an individual court or specific county as the exclusive forum. E.g., Stewart Org. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22. 24 n.l (1988) ("[The contracting parties] agree that any appropriate state or federal
district court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement ....");
Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F,2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1988)
("No action or proceeding shall be commenced by [Koch] against [NYCCDC] except in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of New York."). These various exclusive forum agreements
are sometimes referred to as "mandatory" clauses,
Other clauses may be nonexclusive in that they consent to jurisdiction in a specific slate or
court, but do not prohibit litigation in other locations. E.g., Heyco, Inc. v. Heyman, 636 F. Supp. 1545,
1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (construing the following clause to be permissive: "he parties expressly hereby
submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of ...New Jersey for resolution of all disputes arising
under this Agreement."). These nonexclusive forum agreements are sometimes referred to as "permissive" clauses, or as "submission to jurisdiction" clauses. Finally, some forum selection clauses may be
mandatory as to one party to the contract, but permissive as to the other. E.g., Product Components v.
Regency Door & Hardware. 568 F. Supp. 651, 652 (S.D. Ind. 1983) ("The parties agree that all controversies arising hereunder may, at Seller's option, be determined in [Indiana] and Buyer hereby
expressly consents to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts ....").
2. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: ConsensualAdjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORD. L. REV. 291. 315-19 (1988). Although this article will
focus on clauses designating judicial forums, agreements to arbitrate disputes are also quite common in
certain industries. The history of agreements to arbitrate parallels that of judicial forum selection clauses. Id. Despite congressional enactment in 1925 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, for
the express purpose of promoting arbitration agreements, courts generally were hostile to arbitration
clauses, viewing them as unlawful agreements to oust courts of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan.
346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (rendering an arbitration agreement invalid on grounds that "protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness"). This changed quickly, first at the federal level then at the state level, due to the Supreme
Court's endorsement of agreements to arbitrate. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes a federal policy favoring
arbitration and requiring that courts rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate); Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal in an
international commercial transaction). As will become evident, if a commercial party really wants
certainty as to forum (as opposed to the fuller procedural protections of the judicial system), there are
some definite advantages to a forum selection clause which designates arbitration as the forum to
resolve contract disputes. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (providing that all contracts
with agreements to arbitrate disputes arising from such contracts are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" unless invalid on other independent contract grounds). A more detailed explanation of the effect
of arbitration agreements on forum selection clause analysis can be found in Walter W. Heiser, Forum
Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise.
45 FLA. L. REV. 553 (forthcoming Sept. 1993) [hereinafter Heiser. Federal Courts].
3. Generally, governing law clauses are upheld by courts, although based on somewhat different
considerations than those applicable to forum selection clauses. For example. § 1-105 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides: "Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." U.C.C. § 1-105
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tually alter the choices of forum and law otherwise available to the parties.
This article will discuss the more problematic issues that currently confront state and federal courts asked to enforce forum selection clauses. 4
The discussion is limited to contracts that designate a court rather than
arbitration as the forum to resolve contract disputes, and will focus on
agreements between interstate (as opposed to international) parties that
designate domestic courts to resolve disputes.
Historically, contractual forum selection clauses faced considerable
hostility when parties sought to enforce them, whether in state or federal
court.' This hostility dramatically evaporated after the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.6
Currently, all federal circuits and most state courts endorse the general
principle that forum selection clauses are not automatically void.7 These
courts, however, now struggle with a variety of issues in determining
whether to actually enforce a forum selection clause in an individual case.
This article will discuss some of the case-specific enforcement issues
currently confronting state and federal courts. The article is divided into
two general parts which will be published in separate installments. The
first part analyzes issues of enforcement of forum selection clauses in state
court. State court issues involve the effect of contractual forum selection
clauses on personal jurisdiction and on forum non conveniens. The primary inquiry here is whether these traditional restrictions on a plaintiff's
choice of forum are waived by a contractual provision designating a particular forum to resolve disputes.
These state court issues, while interesting, are not particularly difficult
to resolve. Their analysis is very helpful background, however, for resolving the more difficult issues of enforcement of forum selection clauses in

(1991). This is similar to the judicially adopted standards for enforcement of such clauses where the
U.C.C. does not apply. See Michael Gruson. Governing-Law Clauses in Internationaland Interstate
Loan Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 207. 213. Also, § 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws generally endorses choice of law clauses unless the "chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction" or where application of the chosen law
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1987).
This article will not discuss enforcement of choice of law clauses generally, but will, where
relevant, note their likely impact on the enforcement of forum selection clauses. For a more complete
discussion of the complicated relationship between these two types of clauses, see generally Gruson.
supra, at 207; Mullenix, supra note 2. at 346-56.
4. As a matter of terminology, contractual provisions designating a forum are sometimes referred to as "forum selection clauses," "forum designation clauses." "choice of forum clauses." or
simply as "forum clauses." These terms are used interchangeably by the courts. Unless otherwise indicated, this article will only refer to clauses which designate a judicial, as opposed to an arbitral, forum.
5. See infra note 23.
6. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
7. See infra notes 46-48, 50-54.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

federal court. The second part of this article which will appear in the next
issue of the Florida Law Review will discuss enforcement of forum selection clauses in federal court. The federal court issues are much more complex than those in state courts because of Erie doctrine considerations.'
This article begins with a general discussion of the evolution of judicial enforcement of forum selection clauses. This history is well documented elsewhere, and will only be briefly discussed here.9 The discussion will then focus on two separate issues with respect to the enforceability of such clauses in state court. The first issue is whether a forum selection clause precludes a defendant from contesting the contractually
designated forum's lack of personal jurisdiction. The second issue is
whether such clauses should be viewed as affecting the defendant's right
to seek dismissal based on forum non conveniens. °
The second half of this article will examine issues of enforcement of
forum selection clauses in federal court. The focus of the second half
concerns the interrelationship between forum selection clauses and motions
to transfer or dismiss on venue grounds. Particularly important is the role
of state law in deciding such motions. A number of articles have already
been written about this general topic." But these writings are perhaps
better at identifying issues than resolving them. The same can be said of
the Supreme Court's one recent excursion into this area, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp."2
The Supreme Court's decision in Stewart stated the role of federal and
state law in determining 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfers with respect to
what law generally applies. 3 The opinion speaks so broadly, however,
that it offers little guidance to lower federal courts deciding specific cas-

8. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The reference here is to the general question of
what law applies in federal court, rather than to the more limited ruling in Erie itself. Heiser, Federal
Courts, supra note 2. at 553 (discussing the attendant problems associated with the Erie doctrine when
analyzing forum selection clauses in a federal court context).
9. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG. A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41. at 147-53
(1962); James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts. 65 KY.
L.J. 1. 7-20 (1976): Gruson. supra note 3. at 138-47.
10. A lesser, related issue is whether such clauses waive a defendant's right to transfer venue
from one county to another within the same state. See infra note 220.
11. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements i the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55 (1992); Leandra Lederman.
Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases.
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 291: Phoebe Komfeld. Note. The Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses After Stewart Organization. Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA
L. REV. 175 (1989); Julia L. Erickson. Comment. Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1090
(1988).
12. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
13. Id. at 32.
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es."4 This article will attempt to clarify some of the unresolved federal
court issues, and to put Stewart into appropriate perspective.
The major federal court issues concern what weight should be given a
forum selection clause when a party seeks a transfer of venue pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)," dismissal or transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), 6

dismissal for lack of venue or personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rules
12(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"7 or remand to
state court after removal. What makes these issues complicated is the
question of the proper role of state and federal laws in deciding these
motions. As will be discussed later, Stewart provides some partial answers
but raises some troublesome unresolved questions.

One caveat must be disclosed here. Generally, much of the analysis in
the first part of this article assumes that the forum selection clauses discussed are valid under traditional contract formation principles. In other
words, most of the discussion assumes the clauses are part of a binding
contract and are not the product of fraud, duress, overreaching or unequal
bargaining power. The reason for this assumption is to initially focus the
analysis on the noncontract problems associated with enforcement of forum selection clauses. 8 However, the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute 9 dictates that discussion should also be devoted to contract validity issues.
Considerable scholarly attention has already focused on the Carnival
Cruise opinion.' These scholarly writings are very critical of the Su-

14. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)-(3).
18. This does not mean that the contract grounds are unimportant. In fact, courts have refused to
enforce forum selection clauses because they are invalid or void under contract formation principles.
For example, courts have rendered clauses void because of fraud, overreaching, or unequal bargaining
power. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.14 (finding a forum selection clause unenforceable if inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh
Bros. Garage. 735 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 563
N.E.2d 465. 487 (I11.1990) (rendering a forum selection clause in a boilerplate adhesion contract invalid); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Liberty Temple Universal Church of Christ, 535 A.2d 563, 566 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (stating that a clause signed due to fraud gives rise to a viable defense);
Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 785 P.2d 328, 331 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) (declining
to enforce a clause in a form contract which was the result of unequal bargaining power); Reeves v.
Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729 (Or. 1972) (refusing to enforce forum selection clauses which are the
product of unfair bargaining as in adhesion contracts).
19. 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991).
20. E.g.. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992): Jeffrey A. Liesemer. Carnival's
Got the Fun... and the Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability
Doctrine After Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v. Shute, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1025 (1992); Linda S.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 45

preme Court's nearly wholesale approval of forum selection clauses in
standard consumer form contracts, and argue that such clauses in consumer contracts should not be enforced. These writings are critical of the
Court's failure to distinguish enforcement of forum selection clauses in
consumer contracts from those in commercial contracts. They criticize the
Supreme Court's decision, which extended the Bremen standards to consumer form contracts, as being incorrect from the viewpoint of economic,
social, political, and contract policies." This article, when discussing the
significance of Carnival Cruise, has a much different focus.
This article has two general goals. The first is to analyze the important
procedural issues concerning enforcement of forum selection clauses in
state and in federal courts. In order to isolate these procedural issues,
much of the discussion will focus on freely negotiated forum selection
clauses in commercial contracts.
The second goal is to analyze the likely effect on state and federal
courts of the Supreme Court's extension of the Bremen doctrine to consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise. The focus here is not on whether
Carnival Cruise was correctly decided as a matter of policy considerations. Instead, the focus is on whether, and to what extent, states which
desire to protect consumers from enforcement of forum selection clauses
can do so in state and in federal courts despite Carnival Cruise. These two
goals are not unrelated, as will become evident in the discussion of forum
selection clauses in federal courts.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Until fairly recently, most state and federal courts simply refused to
enforce forum selection clauses-.2 The usual reason given was that such

Mullenix. Another Easy Case. Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal
Jurisdiction. 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.. Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992);
Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatizationof Procedure.25 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 51 (1992); John M. Kirby, Note, Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum
Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L. REV. 888 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 20. at 730-41 (commenting that concepts like venue and personal jurisdiction are elusive to most law students let alone average consumers); Mullenix, supra note
20, at 325-26; Purcell, supra note 20, at 511-15 (proposing that enforcement of forum selection clauses in consumer form contracts conflicts with congressional intent under 28 U.S.C. § 1404). These
critical writings typically conclude that Carnival Cruise is bad law, and that a forum selection clause
in a consumer form contract should be presumed invalid and unenforceable. See, e.g., Goldman, supra
note 20. at 730-41; Mullenix, supra note 20, at 325-26; Purcell. supra note 20. at 511-15.
22. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 138-39 (citing numerous early state and federal cases); Francis
M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of ContractualProvision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action
May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 409-14 (1984) (citing numerous pre-1972 state court cases that
invalidate forum selection clauses because they are contrary to public policy).
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clauses ousted courts of their jurisdiction and were therefore void as
against public policy.2 However, the United States Supreme Court in
1972, in Bremen,' enforced a forum selection clause in an international
commercial maritime contract.'s Although an admiralty case and therefore
not binding on federal or state courts generally,26 the Bremen decision
had an immediate impact on both the lower federal courts and on state
courts.

27

In Bremen, Unterweser, a German corporation, entered into a contract

with Zapata, a Texas corporation, to tow Zapata's oil drilling rig from
Louisiana to Italy. 2' The contract specified that " '[a]ny dispute arising
must be treated before the London Court of Justice.' "29 A storm damaged the rig in international water, and the tug and rig returned to Florida.
Zapata then brought suit in admiralty in a United States District Court in
Florida seeking damages for negligent towage and breach of contract."
Unterweser, seeking to enforce the forum selection clause of the towage contract, sought dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, or based on
forum non conveniens. 3' The district court denied Zapata's motion to dis-

miss or stay the proceedings, because it found that forum selection clauses
were void.32 The court of appeals affirmed.33 The United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded, concluding that a forum selection clause in

an international commercial contract "should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside."'
The Supreme Court held that forum selection clauses are prima facie

23. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445. 451 (1874) ("[A]greements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void."): Carbon Black
Export v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.) (stating that plaintiff's choice of forum should prevail
even when a forum selection clause states otherwise), cert. dismissed 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Nashua
River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., III N.E. 678, 681 (Mass. 1916) ("The same rule [of ouster] prevails generally in all states where the question has arisen."); Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 66 N.E. 627, 628 (N.Y. 1903) ("[N]othing is better settled than that agreements of [this] character.., are void.").
24. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 9-10. The Court emphasized that its judge-made doctrine enforcing the forum selection
clause was limited to admiralty cases dealing with international commercial contracts. Id.
27. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
28. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.at 3.
32. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969). af'd, 428 F.2d 888
(5th Cir. 1970), aff'd en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom.. M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
33. I; re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd en banc, 446 F.2d
907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
34. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
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valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be unreasonable under the circumstances. 5 Characterizing the
argument that such clauses are improper because they oust a court of
jurisdiction as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction," the Court
framed the question as whether a court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce a freely negotiated forum selection clause.36 The Court
reasoned that the need for certainty in international commercial dealings,
as well as the legitimate expectations of the parties in fixing monetary
terms, provide compelling reasons to enforce a freely negotiated private
agreement." The Court noted, however, that it would not enforce a
clause shown to be invalid for reasons such as fraud, undue influence, or
unequal bargaining power.3"
In response to the suggestion that the clause was unreasonable and
unenforceable because London was an inconvenient forum for trial, the
Court imposed a heavy burden of proof on the party seeking to escape the
contract to establish unenforceability.39 The Court noted that the trial
court erroneously placed the burden on Unterweser to show that London
would be a more convenient forum when the balance of convenience
strongly favored litigation in Florida.4" More importantly, the Court observed that the trial court's finding fell "far short of a conclusion that
Zapata would be effectively deprived of its day in court should it be

35. Id.at I].
36. Id.at 12.
37. Id.at 12-14.
38. Id. at 12-15. The Court noted the importance of freedom of contract in commercial transactions as a basis for its holding, emphasizing the freely negotiated private international agreements
should be given full effect. Id. at 12-13. The Court specifically found that the contract between Zapata
and Unterweser, two commercial entities of equal bargaining power, was not affected by fraud or
undue bargaining power, and that the parties
explicitly bargained for the forum selection clause because they viewed it as a vital part of the agreement. Id. at 12-14 & nn.14-15.
39. Id. at 17-18. Specifically, the Court stated:
Whatever "inconvenience" Zapata would suffer by being forced to litigate in the contractual
forum as it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting. In such circumstances it should be incumbent on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial
in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain.
Id. In response to the suggestion that a forum selection clause should not be enforced if the chosen
forum is seriously inconvenient, the Court commented: "[W]here it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time they entered the contract, the parties ... contemplated the claimed inconvenience.
it is difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render the clause unenforceable." Id. at 16. The Court's reasoning compels the conclusion that inconveniences foreseeable at
the time of contract formation cannot provide a basis for refusing to enforce a forum selection clause.
This conclusion has considerable significance in determining forum non conveniens and transfer of
venue motions. See discussion infra part IV.B.
40. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.
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forced to litigate in London."'" The increased expense of transporting
witnesses to London was both foreseeable and could be alleviated by
using deposition testimony.42
The Supreme Court did not actually enforce the forum selection

clause, rather it remanded the case in order to allow Zapata an opportunity
"to carry its heavy burden of showing... that a London trial Will be so

manifestly and gravely inconvenient to Zapata that it will be effectively
deprived of a meaningful day in court."'43 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's message was clear. Forum selection clauses are presumed valid
and will be enforced unless the resisting party proves exceptional unfair-

ness or unreasonableness.'
Despite the Supreme Court's explicit admonishment that the Bremen
holding was limited to admiralty jurisdiction cases and international commercial contracts,45 the lower federal courts have not so limited its

41. Id. at 18-19.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 15-19. The Supreme Court did not expressly define the term "unreasonableness" in this
context. However, the Bremen opinion clearly indicates that three factors will affect the enforceability
of a forum selection clause. Id. at 12-16. One factor focuses on contract formation concerns, i.e.,
whether the clause was freely negotiated or the product of fraud, undue influence, or unequal bargaining power. Id. at 12. A second factor focuses on the convenience of the chosen forum, i.e.. whether it
is so gravely inconvenient as to deny a party his day in court. Id. at 16. The third factor focuses on
public policy concerns of the forum in which the suit is actually brought, i.e., whether enforcement
would contravene a strong public policy of that forum, either declared by statute or by judicial decision. Id. at 15.
Lower courts have occasionally relied on the first or second of these factors in refusing to
enforce a clause. See. e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding the forum selection clause in an adhesive form contract unreasonable); M.G.J. Indus. v.
Davis, 826 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding a forum selection clause unenforceable because it
was the result of fraud); Eads v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 785 P.2d 328, 331 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding a clause unreasonable due to unfair bargaining power); Chase Commercial Corp.
v. Barton, 571 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1990) (holding the contractually designated forum of New Jersey no
longer reasonable because the defendant had moved to California). However, courts more often rely on
the third factor, particularly when the law of the state where suit is actually brought will apply, and a
specific substantive statute of that state expresses a strong public policy that the claim be heard in that
state's courts. See, e.g., Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgeselischaft MbH,
699 F. Supp. 669 (N,D. Ill. 1988) (stating that the public's interest in enforcing the Sherman Act outweighs litigation of forum selection clauses); Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W. Int'l. 686 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding the public's interest in enforcing Title VII to
prohibit changing venue); ECC Computer Ctrs. v. Entre Computer Ctrs., 597 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. I11.
1984) (holding that Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act prohibits clauses specifying a forum outside of
Illinois); Haws & Garrett Gen. Contractors v. Panhandle Custom Decorators & Supply, 500 So. 2d 204
(Ist
DCA 1986), rev. dismissed, 501 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1987) (refusing to transfer case to Texas because of Texas policy against enforcing forum selection clauses); Cerami-Kote v. Energywave Corp.,
773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989) (refusing to transfer to Florida because of Idaho's "strong public policy
against enforcement of forum selection clauses").
45. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
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reach.46 The circuit courts quickly applied the Bremen doctrine to a variety of nonadmiralty cases involving noninternational parties and contracts.47 Currently, every circuit applies the Bremen doctrine in domestic
commercial contract cases where jurisdiction is based on a federal question. 8
Many state courts followed the federal courts' lead. State courts reversed years of hostility to forum selection clauses in purely domestic
commercial contracts, relying on Bremen and an earlier Supreme Court
decision in National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent.49 So complete is this
evolution that today nearly every state court that has considered the issue
since 1972 has held that purely domestic forum selection clauses are prima
facie valid and enforceable." Not all states follow the same test for enforceability as set forth in Bremen,' but most do.5

46. See supra notes 9-11.
47. See supra notes 9 & 11; infra note 48.
48. Because of Erie considerations, the circuits are split on whether the federal Bremen doctrine
or state law doctrine controls where jurisdiction is based on diversity. Compare Jones v. Weibrecht.
901 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying federal law) and Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am.. 858 F.2d
509. 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that federal law governs) with General Eng'r Corp. v. Martin
Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying state law, not federal common law).
49. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
50. See infra note 52. An interesting side note is that neither Bremen nor Szukhent directly controlled these state court decisions. As mentioned previously, the Court in Bremen justified its holding
by emphasizing the need for certainty in international commercial contracts, and limited its holding to
admiralty cases. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. Much of the Court's policy explanation does not readily
apply to purely domestic contracts. For example, the Bremen Court emphasized the adverse consequences of the old rule on the development of international commercial dealings by Americans. with
such statements as: "The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
Moreover, despite some often quoted dicta in Szukhent. this case has little to do with forum
selection clauses. The issue in Szukhent was whether parties to a contract could contractually appoint
an agent for service of process consistent with Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 313. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, but apparently only because the designated agent then notified the defendant of the lawsuit by mail. Id. at 317-18. In dicta.
the Court observed that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether."
Id. at 316. These two cases, despite their narrow holdings, started the movement toward enforceability
of forum selection clauses in state courts.
51. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
52. E.g., Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH. 611 P.2d 498, 503 (Alaska), cert. denied.
449 U.S. 974 (1980); Societe Jean Nicolas et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541, 543 (Ariz. 1979); SD
Leasing v. Al Spain & Assocs., 640 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ark. 1982); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1976); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Diaz, 378 A.2d 108.
109 (Conn. 1977); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1986); Hauenstein & Bermeister,
Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., 320 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1982); Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co.. 495 P.2d 729. 730
(Or. 1972); St. John's Episcopal Mission Ctr. v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs.. 280 S.E.2d 207
(S.C. 1981): Green v. Clinic Masters. 272 N.W.2d 813. 815 (S.D. 1978): International Collection Serv.
v. Gibbs. 510 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Vt. 1986).
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Today, the vast majority of state courts have held that contractual
forum selection clauses are valid and enforceable. 3 A few states have
enacted statutes declaring such clauses enforceable.' Most of the states
have adopted the doctrine set forth in Bremen, and will enforce a clause
unless it deprives a party of its day in court. 5 Other states have adopted
a slightly more flexible test, often referring to the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. 6 These states will enforce a contractually valid clause
which is fair and reasonable. 7 These tests differ from the Bremen doc;
trine by allowing courts more discretion in weighing the inconvenience to
the parties, and consequently more discretion in deciding whether or not to
enforce the clause."
A few states tenaciously cling to the view that forum selection clauses
are per se void and unenforceable. 9 This view is still endorsed by court
decisions in Alabama' ° and Georgia,6 and by statute in other states. 62

Recent converts include Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See High Life Sales Co.
v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1992); Perkins v. CCH Computax, 423 S.E.2d
780, 784 (N.C. 1992); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Paul Business
Sys. v. Canon, U.S.A., 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va. 1990).
53. See supra note 52.
54. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-415 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508-A (1983); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-04.1 (1991); OHIO
REV. CODE § 2307.39 (Anderson Supp. 1992). These states have apparently adopted the Model Uniform Choice of Forum Act. This Act, reprinted in Willis L.M. Reese. The Model Choice Act of Forum
Act, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 292 (1969). contains criteria for enforcement similar to those found in Bremen. See Solimine. supra note 20. at 90-91.
55. See supra notes 52, 54.
56. E.g., ABC Mobile Sys. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo. App. 1985); Hauenstein &
Beneister,320 N.W.2d at 886; Reeves. 495 P.2d at 729.
57. The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80. as adopted in 1971, provided:
"The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but
such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLtCT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). The American Law Institute amended § 80 in 1986 to now state:
"The parties' agreement as to the place of the action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 80 (1986).
58. E.g., Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.E.2d 432 (Iowa 1982)
(finding a forum selection clause neither absolutely binding nor absolutely void, but a factor to help
the court decide, in its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction); Hauenstein & Bermeister. 320 N.W.2d at
889-90.
59. See Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1087, 1093 n.31 (1989) (citing
cases which find such clauses per se invalid).
60. See White-Spunner Constr. v. Cliff, 588 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 1991); Keelean v. Central Bank of
the South, 544 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1989); Redwing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980).
61. See Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment. 209 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
But see Stephens v. Entre Computer Ctrs.. 696 F. Supp. 636. 640 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (noting that
while such clauses violate Georgia public policy federal procedural rules governed thus allowing the
Court to uphold the clause).
62. E.g., Cerami-Kote v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989) (holding that public
policy expressed in IDAHO CODE § 29-110 prohibits enforcement of forum selection clause); Polaris
Indus. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1985) (stating that the public policy expressed in MONT.
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The stated reason for this traditional view is that a forum selection clause
ousts a court of its jurisdiction and is therefore invalid as against public
policy.63 A handful of states have not squarely addressed this question in
post-Bi'emen litigation.'
One state that has recently addressed the question, Florida, rejected the
traditional view that forum selection clauses are void but with an interesting limitation. The Florida Supreme Court in McRae v. J.D./M.D.65 considered the validity of a forum selection clause designating the state courts
of Florida as the appropriate forum.' The court concluded that such
clauses are valid and enforceable, but only if Florida otherwise has some
independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.67
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Most recently the Supreme Court extended the Bremen doctrine to
domestic consumer form contracts in another admiralty jurisdiction case,
Carnival Cruise.6" In Carnival Cruise, the Shutes purchased cruise tickets
from Carnival Cruise Lines through a travel agent in their home state of
Washington.69 Carnival Cruise Lines sent the Shutes tickets from its
headquarters in Miami, Florida.7" The face of each ticket contained an

CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 renders forum selection clauses void).

63. Cliff, 588 So. 2d at 866. These state court decisions rarely offer any additional explanation or
justification for their conclusions that such clauses are void. See id.; Keelean. 544 So. 2d at 155-56.
The most likely explanation for this traditional view is that these states have confused subject matter
jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by consent, with personal jurisdiction and venue. Each state is,
of course, free to declare its own doctrine with respect to forum selection clauses because Bremen and
Carnival Cruise Lines, both admiralty jurisdiction cases, are not directly binding on the states. See
supra note 26; infra note 80. However, this traditional view seems particularly outdated in light of
Bremen's determination that such clauses do not oust a court of its jurisdiction. See Bremen, 407 U.S.
at 12.
Federal courts are, of course, courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 2. cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). They also have a long tradition of jurisdiction-divesting doctrines
(e.g., abstention, exhaustion of administrative remedies) not applicable in state courts. But most states,
including Alabama, recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Employers Ins. v. Alabama
Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 590 So. 2d 888, 892-93 (Ala. 1991) (stating that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not available in Alabama until adoption of the 1987 amendment to ALA. CODE § 6-5-430).
But see Smith v. Board of Regents, 302 S.E.2d 124, 125-26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that Georgia
courts have never expressly sanctioned the doctrine of forum non conveniens). However, these states
do not explain why a forum selection clause impermissibly divests a court of jurisdiction. whereas
forum non conveniens does not. See Employers Ins., 590 So. 2d at 892-93.
64. See supra notes 52-54, 60-62 (listing cases from states that have addressed the issue of forum
selection clause validity post-Bremen).
65. 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987).

66. Id. at 541.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 544; see also infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text (discussing in detail McRae).
111 S. Ct. at 1522.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
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exclusive forum selection clause requiring all disputes in connection with
this contract to be litigated only in Florida courts. 7'
The Shutes boarded the cruise ship in California to sail to Puerto
Vallarta, Mexico.72 While the ship was in international waters, Mrs. Shute
was injured when she slipped on a deck mat.73 The Shutes filed suit in
the United States District Court in Washington claiming injuries caused by
defendant Carnival Cruise Line's negligence.74 The defendant moved for
summary judgment, contending that the forum selection clause in
plaintiff's ticket required the Shutes to bring their suit in a Florida
court.75 The district court granted the motion, but the court of appeals
reversed.76 The court of appeals acknowledged that the Bremen doctrine
controlled, but concluded that the forum selection clause should not be
enforced because it "was not freely bargained for."77 As an independent
justification for refusing to enforce the clause, the court of appeals noted
there was evidence in the record to indicate that the Shutes were physically and financially incapable of pursuing their litigation in Florida, and
thus, the enforcement of the clause would operate to deprive them of their
day in court in contravention of the Bremen doctrine.78
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the court of appeals
erred in refusing to enforce the forum selection clause.79 The Court
agreed that the federal common law Bremen doctrine applied in an admiralty jurisdiction case,8" but reached the opposite conclusion regarding
enforcement of the clause.8'
The Court stated three reasons for enforcing the clause. First, the
Court found the clause reasonable even though it was not bargained for by
the Shutes.82 Indeed, the Court did not expect there would be any negoti-

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991).
For a complete summary of the numerous lower court decisions which preceded Supreme Court review, see Mullenix, supra note 20, at 327-35.
77. Shute, 897 F.2d at 389. The court of appeals held that the clause did not represent the express
intent of the parties because the provision was printed on the ticket and presented to the purchasers on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Id. at 388-89. The court also doubted that the Shutes had notice of the
clause because they apparently had no opportunity to review the terms and conditions printed on the
ticket until after the transaction was completed. Id. at 389 n. 11.
78. Id.at 389 (citing Bremen. 407 U.S. at 18).
79. Carnival Cruise, 111 S.Ct. at 1528.
80. Id. at 1525. In delineating the boundaries of its inquiry, the Court noted that the case was in
admiralty, and federal common law governed the enforceability of the forum selection clause. Id.
81. Id. at 1529.
82. Id. at 1527.
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ation over the terms of the clause:
Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form
contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that
an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining parity
with the cruise line .... [W]e must refine the analysis of The
Bremen [sic] to account for the realities of form ... contracts. 3
Despite the obvious lack of bargaining between unequal parties, the Court
found the forum selection clause in a form contract reasonable because of
the benefits it conferred on the parties." Carnival Cruise benefited from
the certainty and savings established by the clause, and the Shutes
benefited, "in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the
cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued."85
Second, the Court refused to accept the court of appeals' determination that the clause should not be enforced due to the Shutes' inability to
pursue this litigation in Florida because the trial court had made no factual
finding regarding whether the Shutes were physically or financially prohibited from pursuing their case in Florida.86 Furthermore, the Court
found that Florida was not a "remote alien forum," and that this case was
not essentially a local Washington dispute. 7 Accordingly, the Court held
that the Shutes did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof required to set
aside the clause on grounds of inconvenience. 8
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1528.
85. Id. at 1527. These proffered benefits to Carnival Cruise Lines and to the Shutes have been
criticized as illusory. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 20, at 714-30: Mullenix, supra note 20, at 34244. The Court's suggested benefits make some sense, however, in light of the Court's observation in
Bremen that one party to a contractual forum selection clause receives a price reduction in return for
the other party's ability to control the expenses associated with potential litigation. See Bremen. 407
U.S. at 13-14.
86. Carnival Cruise, Ill S. Ct. at 1527-28. The Court refused to defer to the court of appeals'
conclusory reference to the record because the district court in Washington. which actually dismissed
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, made no findings of fact regarding the Shutes' financial and
physical capabilities. Id. at 1528. By affirming the district court's dismissal, the Court refused to afford the Shutes an opportunity to make such a factual showing on remand. The Court's treatment of
this issue seems particularly unfair to the Shutes in light of the fact that the reasonableness of the
forum selection clause was apparently not an issue considered by the trial court. See Liesemer, supra
note 20, at 1049-51; Mullenix, supra note 20, at 341 n.101.
Because the Court disposed of the "financially and physically incapable" issue in this manner.
it did not discuss the extent to which such a trial court finding is relevant to the enforcement of a
consumer form contract forum selection clause, nor the appropriate standards a trial court should utilize in determining whether such a finding is appropriate. This omission leaves the lower courts with
little guidance on this unreasonableness issue.
87. Carnival Cruise, Il S. Ct. at 1527-28.
88. Id. at 1528. The Supreme Court's willingness to force the Shutes, individual consumers and
residents of Washington, to litigate in Florida leads to the inescapable conclusion that no domestic
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Finally, the Court viewed the clause as fundamentally fair because
Carnival Cruise had its principal place of business in Florida, and there
was no evidence of fraud or overreaching.89 The Court emphasized that
the Shutes conceded they had notice of the clause, and therefore presumably retained the option of rejecting the contract with impunity. ° Because
the clause was reasonable and fundamentally fair, and the forum was not
inconvenient, the Court concluded that the unbargained for forum selection
clause was enforceable. 9'
Carnival Cruise makes several important modifications to the forum
selection clause doctrine endorsed in Bremen. The Court will now enforce
a forum selection clause in a consumer contract even if it is a standard
form contract between parties of unequal bargaining power, and even
though the clause is not the subject of negotiation. 2 The Court presumes
that such a clause is valid and enforceable, even though it is between an
individual consumer and a large interstate company.93 The consumer must
satisfy a heavy burden to prove that enforcement of the clause will be so
inconvenient as to deprive consumers of their day in court.' The Court
will neither assume such inconvenience exists based on likely physical and

financial inability to litigate in the designated forum, nor will it assume
that the designated forum is unreasonable simply because of its distant

forum could be considered so unreasonably remote as to practically deprive the litigants of their day in
court within the meaning of the Bremen doctrine. Bremen. 407 U.S. at 17-18. Before Carnival Cruise,
this conclusion seemed likely with respect to interstate commercial contracts, but less likely as to consumer contracts. See Gruson, supra note 3, at 179-83; Mullenix. supra note 2. at 359 n.375. Now,
after Carnival Cruise, even a contract clause which forces a consumer to litigate in the opposite corner
of the United States survives the Bremen test. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
89. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1528-29.
90. Id. at 1525, 1528. This was an unfortunate concession. According to the dissenting opinion,
not only is it very unlikely that any consumer is aware of such terms contained in a standard form
contract, but the Shutes also had no opportunity to read this provision until after they had purchased
their tickets. See id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion suggests that lack of notice may have some effect on the reasonableness
of enforcing a forum selection clause, but does not discuss the nature of that effect. See id. at 1527-28.
Most commentators argue, and some lower courts have held, that a forum selection clause buried in a
standard form consumer contract rarely constitutes sufficient notice and should not be enforced. See,
e.g., Berman v. Cunard Line, 771 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that a forum selection clause in a form passenger ticket is unenforceable when the plaintiff lacked notice of it); Homing v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (holding that a forum selection clause was unenforceable when it was "only one of many clauses in the form contract that together representled] the
best job of boiler-plating since the building of the Monitor."); Tandy Computer Leasing v. Terina's
Pizza. 784 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1989); Goldman, supra note 20, at 716-21; supra note 18 (noting situations
where forum selection clauses are unenforceable due to violations of general contract formation principles).
91. Carnival Cruise, I11 S. Ct. at 1529.

92. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
94. See Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
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geographic location." In other words, the Court will presume a forum
selection clause in a consumer contract is valid and enforceable, and will
require the resisting party-even if that party is a consumer-to satisfy the
heavy burden of proving that enforcement would be unreasonable."
The Carnival Cruise opinion has been roundly criticized as unfair,
unrealistic, and anticonsumer.9 7 These criticisms may well be justified.
The full impact of the opinion is difficult to assess, however, because the
Court failed to address some key issues. The parties conceded the issue of
notice, for example, and the Court therefore saw no need to discuss the
effect lack of notice of the forum selection clause would have with respect
to its enforcement in a standard consumer form contract.98 Moreover, the
Court did not deem it necessary to explain what facts, if any, were necessary to establish a finding that consumers are financially and physically
unable to litigate in the designated forum; nor what effect such a finding
should have on clause enforcement." Nevertheless, a reasonably safe
characterization of the Carnival Cruise opinion is that it is not
proconsumer.
Like Bremen, Carnival Cruise is an admiralty jurisdiction case based
on federal common law, and is therefore not generally binding on lower
federal courts or state courts."° Each state is free to either adopt or reject
Carnival Cruise, or to formulate rules applicable to forum selection clauses in consumer contracts different from those in commercial ones. However, the current fear is that state and lower federal courts will adopt the Supreme Court's Carnival Cruise doctrine favoring enforcement of forum
selection clauses in unbargained for standard consumer form contracts for
all civil actions just as they adopted the Bremen doctrine for commercial
contracts." ' There certainly are a variety of legitimate policy reasons for
a state not to enforce forum selection clauses in adhesive consumer contracts with the same vigor as those in freely negotiated commercial contracts. 12

95. Id.
96. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 20, at 701; Liesemer, supra note 20. at 1028-29; Mullenix,
supra note 20, at 325-26; Purcell, supra note 20, at 430-36; Kirby, supra note 20, at 889; Julie H.
Bruch, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts:An Unconscionable Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, 23 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 329. 330 (1992).
98. See supra note 90.
99. See supra notes 86-88.
100. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 20, 97.
102. The Carnival Cruise Court's federal common law reflects several debatable policy determinations regarding reasonableness, economics, adhesion contracts, notice, and fairness. Each state is free
to resolve such determinations in a different manner when developing its standards for enforcement of
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. Liesemer. supra note 20, at 1028.
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Whatever approach a state adopts may protect consumers in state
court. But the important question remains: Will such protective state doctrine be followed by the federal courts? The answer to this question will
be discussed in the second installment of this article. First, a look at state
court forum selection clause issues is found in Part IV.
IV. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN STATE COURT
As discussed above, the majority of states now have appellate court
decisions holding that forum selection clauses are not void per se as
against public policy. 3 This part discusses the two main procedural issues now faced by these state courts when asked to enforce forum selection clauses." ° The first issue is whether a forum selection clause should
be enforced when the contractually designated forum otherwise lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The second issue is whether a
forum selection clause waives the parties' right to contest the designated
forum through a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, and,
if not, what weight should be given to the clause when such a motion is
made."5 A subsidiary issue is what effect a court should give to a contractual provision that designates the law applicable to the construction of

the contract.'O'
This article will not discuss how a state should decide these policy considerations. For an excellent explanation of why the Supreme Court incorrectly resolved these policy issues in Carnival
Cruise, and why forum selection clauses in consumer contracts should be prima facie invalid, see
generally Goldman, supra note 20. Instead, this article will focus on whether any jurisdictional or
venue-related doctrines limit the freedom of the state and lower federal courts to develop standards different from those endorsed by Carnival Cruise for enforcement of forum selection clauses in consumer
contracts.
103. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
104. The focus here is on procedural issues and not on the contract formation issues of whether
the clause is invalid due to fraud, overreaching, or unequal bargaining power. The procedural issues
are currently troubling to state courts. These issues are relatively simple to resolve, however, and
should not present serious ongoing problems.
By contrast, the contract formation issues potentially are present in every contract case, and in
every forum selection clause case. For reasons discussed later, state courts will eventually devote far
more attention to these contract issues than to the procedural ones.
105. A related issue concerns clauses which designate a court in a specific county, and the defendant seeks to transfer venue to another county within the same state. See infra note 220.
106. Other forum selection clause issues confronting state courts involve construction and application of the Bremen's reasonableness requirement. See Mullenix, supra note 20, at 347 (identifying 21
different tests and factors that lower federal courts have evaluated in assessing reasonableness);
Mullenix. supra note 2, at 356-60 (reviewing several cases that provide nine different definitions of
reasonableness, and concluding that any workable test has been largely ignored in favor of "freelance
judicial bucaneering").
Other issues involve interpretation of ambiguous contractual language, such as whether the
parties intended a forum selection clause to be mandatory or permissive. See Mullenix, supra note 2,
at 298-99 nn.17-19 (citing numerous cases construing ambiguous clauses as either permissive or mandatory). Another issue involving the interpretation of ambiguous language concerns whether the parties
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A state court's endorsement of the Bremen doctrine, which presumes
forum selection clauses are enforceable, means that concern over forumshopping is no longer an issue. Making these clauses enforceable, particularly exclusive clauses, establishes that parties may contractually waive
whatever forum-shopping choices plaintiffs would otherwise have available to them. The plaintiff who contractually agreed to litigate in an exclusive forum gives up the right to choose among several possible states'
courts available under the liberal doctrine of personal jurisdiction, as well
as tactical forum-shopping choices based on conflict of law principles. °7
A. Forum Selection Clauses and PersonalJurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction concerns the ability of a state court to enter a
binding judgment against a nonresident defendant.0 8 Together with subject matter jurisdiction and adequate notice, personal jurisdiction is one of
the three requirements for a valid judgment." If a defendant properly
objects, and the court determines that it lacks personal jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the case because it lacks power to enter a binding
judgment against that defendant."'
A state court's personal jurisdiction is limited by both the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by that state's long-arm statutes
defining the court's personal jurisdiction."' The Due Process Clause per-

intended a forum selection clause to govern tort actions arising out of the contractual relationship. See
Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Cal. 1976).
107. A savvy plaintiff may choose to litigate in a particular state based on that state's choice of
law doctrine, in order to capture favorable substantive law or statute of limitations. See. e.g., Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman. 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that is it constitutionally permissible for a state court.
based on the state's choice of law doctrine, to apply its own statute of limitations even though the
claims are governed by the substantive law of another state); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague. 449 U.S. 302
(1981) (holding that a state may apply its own substantive law when the parties have sufficient contact
with the state so that application of its law is not unfair). An exclusive forum selection clause eliminates this strategic litigation option. Of course, a choice of law clause also removes this option by
designating which substantive law governs any dispute arising out of the contract, regardless of whether a forum selection clause exists. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S. 462 (1985)
(holding that a choice of law provision should be considered in determining whether a party has purposely availed themselves of the state's law for jurisdictional purposes).
108. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
109. See Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) ("The
validity of an order depends upon that court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the
parties."); Kulko v. Superior Court. 436 U.S. 84. 91 (1978) (stating that personal jurisdiction and notice are necessary in order for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); Mullane
v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (requiring constitutionally adequate notice as a
prerequisite to a valid judgment).
110. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917):
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 465 (1873).
111. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-73; Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia. S.A. v.
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mits a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum state." n
Conversely, if the defendant does not have minimum contacts with the

forum state, and the defendant properly objects, the court cannot constitutionally enter a valid judgment against the defendant." 3
The Due Process Clause therefore sets forth the outer limits of a state
court's personal jurisdiction. But within this constitutional boundary, each

state is free to limit its courts' personal jurisdiction as much as it sees
fit. 4 In theory, a state could decide to limit its courts' personal jurisdiction only to defendants who are residents of that state. More realistically, a
state may choose to limit its jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to
occasions that meet a list of specified factors, many of which are less expansive than what due process would permit under the minimum contacts

test."5
Consequently, a state court seeking to assert personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant must do so consistent with both the state's jurisdictional statute and the Due Process Clause." 6 If a state statute extends
personal jurisdiction beyond what due process permits, the application of
that statute to a nonresident defendant will violate the Due Process Clause
and will be deemed invalid." 7
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984).
112. The minimum contacts test originated in InternationalShoe, where the Supreme Court recast
the rigid presence test of Pennoyer by holding that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court concluded
that all assertion of state court personal jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the minimum contacts standards of InternationalShoe and its progeny, regardless of whether the litigation is characterized as in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-12. Although embellished by
concepts of reasonableness and transient jurisdiction, minimum contacts analysis remains the central
due process test. See infra note 126.
113. See Helicopteros. 466 U.S. at 414; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291; Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 216-17.
114. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952); Missouri Pac. RR. v.
Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4.
cmts. b & c (1982). See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Betveen State and FederalLaw.
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954) (discussing the role of federalism in the interplay between federal and
state court jurisdiction); Willus L.M. Reese & Nina M. Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249, 265 (1959) (discussing the background and bases for due process requirements of judicial jurisdiction).
115. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (providing examples of states that use specific
factors to determine whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted).
116. The scope of a state's personal jurisdiction is typically specified by state statute, and usually
referred to as a long-arm statute. See infra note 175. For a state-by-state survey of state long-arm
statutes, see ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTtON INCIVIL ACTIONS app. E (2d ed. 1991).
117. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 186 (rejecting a Delaware sequestration statute as violative of due
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A typical forum selection clause will designate that all disputes arising
out of the contract must be litigated in the courts of a specific state. Not
all forum selection clauses designate an exclusive forum. Many simply
state that the parties consent to be sued in the courts of the specific
state."' Under either type of forum selection clause, a problem develops
when a lawsuit is filed in the designated forum and that state has no basis
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant other than the forum selection
clause.
A hypothetical may help illustrate this issue. Assume that a Florida
company and a New York company enter into a commercial contract
which designates the state courts of Florida as the exclusive forum to
adjudicate any disputes arising out of the contract, and both parties expressly consent to be sued in Florida courts. Assume further that a dispute
arises as to whether the New York company has breached the contract,
and the Florida company commences an action against the New York
company in the appropriate Florida state court. The New York defendant
then timely moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The clause presents no jurisdictional problems in our hypothetical if
the Florida court has an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction independent of the forum selection clause. For example, there is no constitutional
issue if the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of
Florida;.. 9 and no statutory issue if the defendant's contacts with Florida
provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. 121 In such cases, the clause simply operates to designate one specific
state forum from among many other permissible state forums. '2 ' The

process because it permited state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction despite the absence of a
defendant's minimum contacts with the State of Delaware).
118. For example, the contract may provide that the courts of the State of Florida are the exclusive
forums to adjudicate contract disputes, or it may simply provide that the parties to the contract consent
to be sued in the courts of the State of Florida. For purposes of this personal jurisdiction issue, whether the clause is mandatory (i.e., designates a state as the exclusive forum) or simply permissive (i.e..
consents to be sued in a specific state) is of no consequence to the analysis.
119. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462; Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais. 554 So. 2d 499, 503
(1989).
120. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.193-.194 (West Supp. 1993).
121. In the absence of a forum selection clause, our Florida plaintiff may constitutionally bring
suit in any state with which the New York defendant has sufficient minimum contacts. This may be
New York, or any other state where the defendant has sufficient contacts to satisfy due process and the
forum state's long-arm statutes. If the New York defendant is a large company which conducts "continuous and systematic" business in all states, then a court in any state is likely to be able to assert
personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the concept of general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros.
466 U.S. at 414 n.9 ("When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant."). In such circumstances, due process requires that the
defendant's contacts with the forum state be continuous and systematic. Id. at 414-16 (citing Perkins v.
Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). For a more thorough discussion of general juris-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss3/1

20

Heiser: Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforceme
FORUMSELECTION CLAUSES IN STATE COURTS

clause here accomplishes its general purpose, i.e., to provide some cer-

tainty if a dispute arises in this commercial contractual relationship."2

The Florida court should deny the motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction.
But what if the only basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is the forum selection clause? In other words, in the hypothetical, there is no constitutional or statutory basis for the Florida court to
assert personal jurisdiction over the New York defendant absent the forum
selection clause. The New York defendant has no meaningful contacts of
any kind with the State of Florida."2
This issue is really quite simple to analyze, but does merit some explanation. Surprisingly, few state courts have squarely addressed this issue.
In order to understand the resolution, it is important to understand the
nature of a defendant's personal jurisdiction right.
As previously mentioned, we know from InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington'24 and its progeny that a state can assert personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause if the defendant has sufficient minimum

contacts with the forum state." If the defendant lacks minimum contacts
with the forum state, that state lacks the ability to enter a valid, binding
judgment against the defendant. 126 A defendant can waive this due pro-

diction, see Lea Brilmayer et al.. A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tax. L. REv. 721
(1988): B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TuL. L. Rsy. 1097 (1990); Mary
Twitchell, The Myth of GeneralJurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1988).
122. This also assumes, of course, that Florida is a state which does not view forum selection
clauses per se void as contrary to public policy. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. In fact,
until fairly recently there was some doubt as to where Florida courts stood on this public policy question. Compare Zurich Ins. Co. v. Allen, 436 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (declaring forum selection clauses void) with Maritime Ltd. Partnership v. Greenman Advertising Assocs., 455 So. 2d
1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (declaring forum selection clauses enforceable under certain conditions).
The Florida Supreme Court settled the issue in Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1986), and
held that forum selection clauses are not per se void on public policy grounds. Id. at 440.
123. The contract with the Florida company is a contact, but not necessarily sufficient by itself to
provide the requisite minimum contacts. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79. Perhaps an easier, but
less realistic. hypothetical is where the Florida and New York companies contractually designate a
neutral forum such as North Carolina in their forum selection clause, and the defendant has no contacts with North Carolina.
124. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
125. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
126. The minimum contacts analysis first developed in International Shoe remains the central due
process test for evaluating all assertions of state court personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 136. However, the Supreme Court has also developed some subsidiary
considerations. In appropriate cases, a state should not assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, even one who has purposely established minimum contacts in the forum state, where the
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 113 (1987). This so-called reasonableness consideration includes evaluation of several factors: The burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
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cess right. Traditionally, for example, a defendant can waive this constitutional right by simply not raising it by proper objection at the relevant
time in a lawsuit.1 27 In typical state court terminology, this type of waiver is known as a "general appearance."' 28
A general appearance waiver is not very difficult to accomplish, in
part because the rules for properly making a "special appearance" can be
quite technical. Even an unintentional failure to raise an objection to personal jurisdiction will result in a waiver of the defendant's due process
right. 9 A defendant who has no contacts with the forum state can waive
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
Another constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction is transient jurisdiction. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990). The doctrine of transient jurisdiction depends solely on
service of the complaint and summons on the defendant while present in the forum state, regardless of
whether the defendant otherwise has any minimum contacts with the forum state. Id.
127. When and how such a waiver occurs varies from state to state and is usually specified by
statute or court rule. For example. in California defendants waive any right to contest personal jurisdiction unless they file a timely motion to quash as their first and only appearance. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 418.10(a)(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1992). If this motion is not made at the first appearance
(except where defending against a temporary restraining order application), or is combined with any
other motion (except one to dismiss based on forum non conveniens), the appearance will constitute a
general appearance. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 418.10(a), 418.11, 1014 (West 1973 & Supp. 1992):
see also California Dental Ass'n v. American Dental Ass'n, 590 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1979) (stating that a
defendant must appear specially to challenge personal jurisdiction only and waives the right to object
if simultaneously appearing for some other purpose or to answer to the merits).
In many states, if the defendant combines any other objection in the first appearance-even to
the court's subject matter jurisdiction or venue-the appearance will be considered general. See
CASAD, supra note 116, § 3.0115][a], at 3-44 to -48 nn.138-52 (citing numerous cases from several
states). Until 1962, Texas permitted no special appearances, and even today authorizes only their limited use. See W. Frank Newton & Jeremy C. Wicker, Personal Jurisdiction and the Appearance to
Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 560-78 (1986).
By contrast, in those states that have adopted rules based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant does not waive the right to object so long as raised in the first appearance, even
when combined with other motions or stated in an answer which also responds to the merits. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h). Approximately one-half of the states have appearance rules which replicate the
Federal Rules, and require only that the objection be raised in the defendant's first appearance, whether by motion or answer. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986) (analyzing those states whose rules track the Federal Rules).
128. General appearance as used here simply means any activity taken by a defendant in a lawsuit
which, pursuant to relevant state law, has the effect of waiving that defendant's right to contest personal jurisdiction. What constitutes a general appearance varies from state to state. See CASAD. supra
note 116, § 3.01[5][a]; supra note 127. Litigation activity which preserves the right to object is usually
referred to as a special appearance. Although use of these terms has fallen out of favor, they still provide a useful distinction between litigation involvement which will-or will not-waive an objection
to personal jurisdiction.
129. Regardless of the defendant's desire not to consent to a court's jurisdiction, many litigation
activities will constitute a general appearance. For example, in many states filing an answer is a general appearance even though it raises an objection to personal jurisdiction. See CASAD, supra note 116, §
3.01[5][a] (citing numerous cases from various states). Even a motion for a continuance or for an
extension of time to plead may constitute a general appearance. Id. § 3.01[5][a], at 3-46 to -47 nn.146-
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the right to object to personal jurisdiction by simply failing to raise this
objection in a timely or proper manner.'30
The concept of a general appearance waiver existed long before the
Supreme Court linked personal jurisdiction to the Due Process Clause. 3 '
When personal jurisdiction became a constitutional doctrine in 1877 by
virtue of Pennoyer v. Neff,'32 the Court reiterated the traditional concept
that a state court could obtain personal jurisdiction solely by a defendant's
general appearance in the lawsuit.'33 Even though the Court occasionally
struggled with this waiver concept because it was unsure of the basis of
the defendant's due process right in personal jurisdiction, the Court never
questioned a defendant's ability to submit to a court's personal jurisdiction
through an appearance."
The Supreme Court finally clearly defined the nature of a defendant's
personal jurisdiction right in Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites

de Guinee'35 The Court emphasized that personal jurisdiction flows from
the Due Process Clause and not from some other part of the Constitution."' Moreover, the Court announced that the "personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest."'37 Finally, the Court noted that because personal jurisdiction represents an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.'38 This right can be

47.
130. See supra note 127.
131. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 719 (1838) ("An objection to
jurisdiction, on the ground of exemption from the process of the court in which the suit is brought, or
the manner in which a defendant is brought into it, is waived by appearance and pleading to issue.");
Loomis v. Wadhams, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 557, 561 (1857) ("Any defect of service or of jurisdiction, so
far as the person of the defendant was concerned, had been waived by his appearance and answer.");
Grantier v. Rosecrance, 27 Wis. 488. 491 (1871) ("Coming into court and moving that the judgment
be set aside ...was a general appearance in the case, and cured all irregularity in the service of process.").
132. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
133. Id. at 720,
134. Under Pennoyer, personal jurisdiction was based on principles of state sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. Id. at 722. This basis for personal jurisdiction seemed inconsistent with waiver through general appearance. Even when the Court announced the modem doctrine of
personal jurisdiction (i.e., minimum contacts) in InternationalShoe, it did not clearly indicate whether
this doctrine fully repudiated state sovereignty as the basis for personal jurisdiction. See supra note
112; infra note 159. Nevertheless, throughout the post-Pennoyer period, the Court continuously indicated that a general appearance confers personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59.
67-68 (1938) (noting that the plaintiff, by filing a complaint in state court, submits to the jurisdiction
of the court voluntarily for purposes of the defendant's counterclaim); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
343, 351-52 (1947); Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524, 530 (1889).
135. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
136. Id. at 702.
137. Id. at 702-03. Personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter
of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Id.
138. Id. at 703.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

intentionally waived by submitting to a court's jurisdiction by appearance, 139 or, as in Insurance Corp., it can be impliedly waived through
failure to comply with a court's discovery orders. 4
There is simply no question that the constitutional requirement of
personal jurisdiction is an individual right that can be waived by a defendant at the time of litigation.' 4' A defendant who waives this right
through a general appearance provides the court with personal jurisdiction
even in the absence of minimum contacts.'42 Is there any reason why a
defendant cannot waive this individual liberty interest in advance of litigation by contractually consenting to suit in a forum state with which the
defendant has no minimum contacts? The Court has not directly answered
this question, although it has approved similar contractual waivers.
The most dramatic contractual waiver upheld by the Supreme Court
was the confession of judgment provision in D.H Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co.'43 In Overmyer, two commercial parties agreed to a contract which
included a provision waiving several rights by debtor Overmyer in the
event of a contract breach.'" This provision authorized creditor Frick to
designate an attorney to appear in Ohio court for debtor Overmyer, to
waive service on Overmyer, and to confess judgment against Overmyer for
the principal and interest on a related note. 4 The Ohio cognovit note
statute authorized such contractual waivers.'46
The Court upheld this application of the Ohio statute, noting that
parties can make voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of their constitutional rights."' The Court was not troubled by the fact that this
waiver was by contract in advance of litigation and rejected Overmyer's
argument that this fact was constitutionally significant.'48 The Court

139. Id.
140. Id. at 705-09.
141. Id. at 703-05.
142. See id. at 703.
143. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
144. Id. at 183.
145. Id. at 180-81.
146. See id. at 175.
147. Id. at 187 (citing National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent. 375 U.S. 311 (1964)). The Court also
observed that the due process rights to notice and a hearing prior to civil judgment are subject to
waiver. Id. at 185. The Court noted that such waivers contained in a commercial contract will be enforced so long as the contract was not one of adhesion, not the result of a great disparity in bargaining
power or fraud, and not one where the debtor received nothing in return for the cognovit provision. Id.
148. Id. at 184. Overmyer argued that the question of whether a defendant's appearance was voluntary must be determined at the time of the court proceeding, not at an earlier date. Id. Overmyer
also argued that it is unconstitutional to waive, in advance, the right to present a defense in an action
on the note. Id. These arguments were rejected by the Court, quoting the dicta from Szukhent that "l1t
is settled ... that parties toa contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether." Id. at
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therefore left no doubt that even the most essential due process rights-the
right to notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to judgment-can be
waived in advance by contract.'49
Despite these clear indications that the Supreme Court will uphold
personal jurisdiction based solely on a forum selection clause, some force-

ful arguments can be made against such a contractual waiver. One argument focuses on the timing of the waiver and includes a mixture of policy
and empiricism. This argument distinguishes between a waiver during
litigation and one made in advance of litigation. Although waiver is permitted by an appearance during litigation, waiver should not be permitted
by a contract in advance of litigation.
This argument is based on the assumptions that many commercial and

consumer contracts are entered into without attorney involvement, and that
a party may agree to a forum selection clause without really understanding
that they are waiving an important due process right. At the time the contract is negotiated, the parties do not expect to end up in court and therefore do not really focus on whatever litigation rights they are waiving in
the contract. Their focus at the time negotiation is on commerce, not litigation.
By contrast, according to this argument, when a defendant enters a
general appearance in a lawsuit and thereby waives any objection to per-

sonal jurisdiction, this waiver is usually accomplished by the defendant's
attorney. Presumably, this attorney is well trained in law and in litigation

tactics. Moreover, this general appearance waiver takes place at a time
when the defendant is focused on litigation (not commerce), having been
served with a complaint and summons. Consequently, the argument is that

the general appearance waiver is knowingly made by the defendant at a
more meaningful time than a waiver made in advance at the time of the
contract. 5 '
185 (citing Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16).
149. The contractual waiver must, however, be valid under general contract principles. See Swarb
v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 198-99, 201 (1972) (stating that a cognovit provision would not be enforced
where it was an unbargained-for clause in an adhesion contract); supra notes 38. 44.
150. This argument is a combination of several arguments advanced by Edward L. Rubin. Edward
L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981). Mr. Rubin argues that
waivers in civil cases should be governed by the same principles applicable to waivers in criminal
cases. Id. at 541. Accordingly, waivers must be voluntarily and knowingly made, as defined in criminal cases. Id. at 491-512, 531-38. Mr. Rubin argues that a contractual waiver should be void if it does
not amount to the functional equivalent of a judicial determination by an impartial decisionmaker. Id.
at 539. Accordingly, "[e]ach party must be aware of the right that is being waived, and there must be
some process of negotiation or bargaining connected with that right." Id. Forum selection clauses must
be bargained for in a way that is equivalent to a judicial hearing; thus, "[t]he parties must deal directly
with each other, discuss the waiver in explicit terms, and have the opportunity to obtain professional
representation." Id. at 559. Mr. Rubin's argument essentially is that contractual waiver of due process
rights must be closely scrutinized and enforced only where there has been the functional equivalent of
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This argument certainly has some force and may provide the kind of
policy basis that would lead a state legislature to enact a jurisdictional
statute which prohibits the enforcement of forum selection clauses where
minimum contacts are absent.' However, as a justification for an absolute prohibition on contractual due process waivers, the argument finds
little support in constitutional reasoning. This argument would mean that a
defendant could never consent to personal jurisdiction in advance, and
such a proposition simply runs counter to the reasoning of Overmyer.
Szukhent, and Bremen.'52 Consequently, such a blanket prohibition on
contractual waivers is not appropriate for civil cases.
First, the argument assumes facts regarding general appearance waivers which are not necessarily true. General appearance waivers are enforced whether made by a defendant with counsel or by a defendant pro
se, 53 whether made intentionally or through inadvertence,'54 and
whether made by express waiver or by implied waiver.'55 Second, ignorance of the precise legal impact of a contract provision is usually not

a judicial determination during adjudication. Id. at 539. Professor Mullenix makes similar arguments.
Mullenix, supra note 2. at 366-73. But see Solimine, supra note 20, at 64-69, 80-81 ("While important, the rights waived by most forum-selection clauses do not demand a higher degree of perfection
than that already provided by contract law ....[Tihe rights involved, personal jurisdiction protections
and the ability to forum shop, are largely personal rights with relatively few structural attributes.").
151. See MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 600.745(2) (West 1981) (imposing restrictions on enforcement of forum selection clauses which provide the only basis of jurisdiction in Michigan courts);
McRae v. J.D./M.D., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987) (construing Florida's long-arm statute); infra notes
165, 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. § 2A-106).
152. Bremen. 407 U.S. at 11; Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185; Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16. In
Overmyer. the defendant argued that whether a defendant's appearance is voluntary must be determined at the time of the court proceeding, not at the earlier date when an agreement is signed.
Overmyer. 405 U.S. at 184. The Supreme Court framed the question as whether the Ohio cognovit
statute was unconstitutional in that it conferred a " 'contract waiver, before suit has been filed, before
any dispute has arisen' " in a context " 'whereby a party gives up in advance his constitutional right' "
to present a defense. Id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief). By affirming the validity of the Ohio cognovit
statute and quoting Szukhent's dicta with approval, the Court directly rejected this argument. Id. at
185. The Court in Bremen viewed the enforcement of the forum selection clause as "merely the other
side of the proposition recognized by this Court in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent."
Bremen. 407 U.S. at 10-1 1. The Court pointed out "that parties to a contract may agree in advance to
submit to the jurisdiction of a given court." Id. at 11 (quoting Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16).
153. See supra notes 127-28.
154. See supra notes 127-28.
155. See CASAD. supra note 116, § 3.01[5]a], at 3-42 to 3-54 nn.139-61. After reviewing numerous states' cases which apply this recognized traditional basis of waiver to various litigation activities.
Professor Casad observed:
It may seem anomalous to describe some of the acts that have been held to constitute a
general appearance as expressing consent to jurisdiction, for the defendant may have no
intent to submit to jurisdiction generally in doing such acts. Nevertheless, by their performance, the party is deemed to waive or be estopped from asserting objections to personal
jurisdiction.
Id. § 3.01[51[a), at 3-53.
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grounds for relief from the contractual obligation, at least where the parties knowingly agreed to the provision.56 Knowledge of the provision's
existence may be required, but not knowledge of its legal effect.
Third, the argument puts a defendant's individual liberty interest on a
higher level than the defendant's desire to exchange that interest for some

commercial or consumer benefit. Although this may sound appropriate
because personal jurisdiction involves a constitutional right, it ignores the
fact that personal jurisdiction is a very waivable constitutional right) 7
Not only is personal jurisdiction waivable, but the possessor of this right

obtains something in return for its waiver in a contract. For example, the
defendant may receive a lower contract price, some other reciprocal concession, or perhaps the very existence of the contract itself. Private contractual agreements to submit to a court's jurisdiction may represent a
genuine exchange benefiting both parties. There would seem to be little

justification for a rule which permits a defendant to benefit twice from an
individual liberty interest: Once when the contract is negotiated and a
second time when used to void the contract's forum selection clause.'58
Moreover, the argument that parties cannot contractually consent to personal jurisdiction implies that the defendant's constitutional right is somehow infused with overriding public concerns, thereby preventing a state
from asserting personal jurisdiction based solely on a forum selection clause."5 9

156. See Paper Express v. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753. 757 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding a forum selection clause despite its being in fine print and in German and stating "[i]t is a
fundamental principle of contract law that a person who signs a contract is presumed to know its terms
and consents to be bound by them ....
Mere ignorance will not relieve a party of her obligations and
she will be bound by the terms of the agreement."); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Graham, 646 F. Supp.
1410. 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that failure to read a contract or hire a lawyer to interpret consequences of a forum selection clause is lack of diligence by the defendant, not misconduct by the plaintiff); Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1991) (noting that failure of a party
to obtain an explanation of a contract term is negligence and not grounds for avoidance). See generally
3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 607 (1960 & Supp. 1993) (commenting that one who
signs an agreement without reading it will be bound by its terms); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.26-.28, at 310-39 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that one who voluntarily signs an agreement
may be bound by it even though he never considers the legal consequence of signing it); 13 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1577 (3d ed., 1970 & Supp. 1993).
157. hIsurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 706 ("This argument again assumes that there is something
unique about the requirement of personal jurisdiction, which prevents it from being established or
waived like other rights.").
158. In this sense express consent to a state's jurisdiction through private agreement is much less
troubling than implied consent through public implied consent agreements imposed by the state based
on the defendant's relations with the state. See generally Lea Brilmayer. Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989) (providing an interesting discussion of the distinction between private
and public agreements to submit to a court's jurisdiction).
159. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 366-73. Professor Mullenix argues that traditional jurisdictional
principles relating to forum access should govern forum selection clause enforceability,
When a plaintiff seeks to enforce a forum-selection clause against a defendant, proper regard should be given to the defendant's due process rights to be sued in a particular fo-
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Finally, the argument against contractual waiver conclusively presumes
that the parties did not knowingly waive their due process rights in the
contract. This presumption makes little sense in commercial contracts
between parties of relatively equal bargaining power, but it has some force
in typical consumer contracts. However, the individual liberty interest
possessed by a consumer is no different than that of a commercial entity,
and certainly a consumer can knowingly waive this due process interest.
There is no reason to conclusively presume a consumer cannot knowingly
waive this interest. The better approach is to presume that the parties
knowingly waived the right to object to the designated court's jurisdiction,
unless the party challenging the designated court can prove otherwise. 6
There is no due process justification for refusing to enforce a forum
selection clause where the designated forum has no other basis for personal jurisdiction. The parties should be permitted to contractually consent to
a court's jurisdiction in advance without violating the Due Process Clause
even if the defendant has no minimum contacts with the forum state. The

rum ....Litigants may choose their forum ... so long as the choices comport with articulated [due process] notions of justice and fair play."
Id. at 368-69; see also Edward P. Gilbert, Comment, We're All in the Same Boat: Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 597, 622-25 (1992) (discussing the Court's misapplication
of Bremen). Essentially, this suggestion seeks to portray personal jurisdiction as at least somewhat
analogous to subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is based on public state sovereignty
interests, and not on private interests. See Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 701-03. Consequently, private
parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction limitations and confer jurisdiction by consent. Id.
If personal jurisdiction likewise involves public or state interests at the constitutional level, then
private parties could not consent to personal jurisdiction where none otherwise existed. The quick
answer is that personal jurisdiction is not like subject matter jurisdiction, it involves only a private liberty interest that can be waived by private parties. The more involved answer recognizes that there are
certain public or state interests involved in the constitutional doctrine of personal jurisdiction.
These state interests show up in two ways in the constitutional analysis. First, state sovereignty
provides the ultimate authority for jurisdiction over a person. This authority is the traditional basis for
jurisdiction over state residents and over nonresidents who are served while present in the state. See
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2114-15 (1990). However, state sovereignty is limited by
the Due Process Clause when a state seeks to assert its authority over a nonresident not present within
the state and is expressed as an individual liberty interest of the defendant. Insurance Corp., 456 U.S.
at 702-03 n.10. Consequently, the individual defendant can waive this limitation and submit to the
state's sovereign power, if the defendant so chooses. Id.
The second way the state's interest is involved is in the due process reasonableness test. See
supra note 126. These reasonableness factors serve as a limitation on a state's personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents in addition to the minimum contacts test. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court. 480 U.S. 102. 113 (1986). Presumably, these limitations are waivable by the defendant, or general appearance waivers would be constitutionally prohibited.
160. This is the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, I ll S.
Ct. 1522 (1991). The Court extended the Bremen doctrine to a forum selection clause in a standard
consumer form contract. Id. at 1527-28. In Carnival Cruise, the contractually designated forum clearly
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. 1525. There is no reason to presume that the
forum selection clause is valid as knowingly made when the forum would otherwise have personal
jurisdiction, but to presume that it is invalid when the forum otherwise lacks personal jurisdiction.
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forum selection clause should be enforced
so long as the clause itself is
6

valid under general contract principles.' '

The concerns expressed through this argument, though, need not be
totally ignored. They may be recognized not as a matter of due process,
but as a matter of legislative policymaking through state statute. A state's
authority to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
limited by both due process and state statute. Each state is free to extend
its courts' jurisdiction to the extent it sees fit, so long as it does not extend personal jurisdiction further than due process permits.'62 Additionally, a state certainly may limit personal jurisdiction far short of what due
process permits. In fact, a state is under no constitutional obligation to
recognize any waiver of personal jurisdiction by a defendant. 63 If a state
adopts some type of waiver doctrine, it may still define and limit the
manner by which a waiver of personal jurisdiction is accomplished."
Consequently, a state, by statute, can simply decline to extend personal
jurisdiction over defendants where the only basis for personal jurisdiction
is a contractual forum selection clause. 6 This is the position taken by
the State of Florida, as illustrated in McRae v. J.D./M.D. 6
In McRae, a New Jersey plaintiff entered into a contract with Mississippi defendants which designated Florida as the exclusive forum for any
contract dispute litigation. Pursuant to this clause, plaintiff sued defen-

161. See supra notes 38. 44. If the forumselection clause is the product of fraud, unequal bargaining power, or undue influence, it will be considered invalid. See supra notes 38, 44. If invalid, the
clause cannot constitute a valid waiver of the defendant's due process rights, and if there exists no
other basis for the court's personal jurisdiction, the designated forum must dismiss the action. See
supra notes 38, 44. Also, to be enforced the clause must be reasonable such that it does not deny the
defendant his day in court. See supra notes 38, 44.
162. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
163. See Keelean v. Central Bank, 544 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala. 1989). All states do, of course, recognize waiver by general appearance. See supra notes 127-29. There is, however, nothing that requires
a state to do so. except common sense. Those states that still void forum selection clauses do not
recognize any contractual waiver of personal jurisdiction concerns. E.g., Keelean, 544 So. 2d at 156
(holding that parties may not confer personal jurisdiction by contractual consent).
164. See supra note 127 (discussing how each state is free to define what litigation activity will
constitute a general appearance).
165. A state which seeks to vindicate a policy of protecting consumers could even enact legislation which would not enforce a forum selection clause in a consumer contract unless an independent
basis of personal jurisdiction existed, although it would enforce the clause under the same circumstances in a contract between two commercial parties. Such consumer legislation would seem unlikely,
however, because such a statute would benefit nonresident defendant-consumers to the detriment of
resident plaintiff-retailers. However, this is precisely the approach taken in new Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2A-106(2) (1991) (dealing with enforcement of forum selection
clauses in consumer leases of goods); see also infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing
U.C.C. § 2A-106(2)). Over 40 states have now adopted § 2A-106(2) as their state law. See infra notes
182-83 and accompanying text.
166. 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987).
167. Id. at 54h1
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dants in a Florida court alleging a contract breach.' 68 The defendants objected to the Florida court's assertion of personal jurisdiction because they
had no contacts with Florida and because no basis for personal jurisdiction
over them existed under Florida's long-arm statute.'69 The plaintiff argued that the defendants waived their constitutional and statutory personal
jurisdiction rights when they agreed to the forum selection clause. 7 '
The Florida Supreme Court held that a contractual forum selection
clause cannot serve as the sole basis for asserting personal jurisdiction in
Florida over an objecting, nonresident defendant.' The court noted that
the Florida long-arm statutes set forth the boundaries concerning when
Florida courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and do not contain any provision for submission to personal jurisdiction merely by contractual agreement. 7 2 The court rejected the plaintiffs
contractual waiver argument by observing that it elevates contract enforceability over the requirements of the state long-arm statute.' Therefore,
Florida will only enforce an otherwise valid contract clause designating
Florida as the forum when there exists an independent statutory basis for a
court to assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defenFlorida
74
dant.1
Many states have statutory schemes similar to Florida's. These states
authorize personal jurisdiction only in a limited set of statutorily enumerated circumstances.175 Interestingly, some of these states enforce forum se168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 542.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 543.
173. Id. at 543-44.
174. See id. at 542-43. The Florida Supreme Court also concluded that. as a matter of due process.
a Florida court could not assert personal jurisdiction based solely on a forum selection clause where
the defendant had no contacts with Florida. Id. at 543. For the reasons discussed earlier, the court's
constitutional ruling is incorrect. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text. However, the court's
statutory ruling is correct. Because a state retains authority to define the limits of its courts' personal
jurisdiction, the state can limit its definition of waiver in a manner that is more restrictive than due
process would permit. See supra notes 111. 127-29 and accompanying text. Implicit in the McRae
court's analysis is a finding that the legislature intended the Florida long-arm statute not to permit
waiver in all circumstances where due process would permit it. Also implicit in the court's interpretation of the Florida long-arm statute is the state public policy of not permitting the defendants to waive
their statutory personal jurisdiction rights prior to litigation through a contractual forum selection
clause.
175. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-124
(West Supp. 1993): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-596 (West 1991): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10. § 3104
(Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19 (West 1988):
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983); LonginesWittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 302 does not confer the full complement of personal jurisdiction constitutionally permitted); Wright v. Automatic Valve Co., 253 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio 1969) (stating that the Ohio legislature
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lection clauses but do not have specific statutory authority to do so.'76 In
these states, a forum selection clause by itself may not be sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction where the clause is the only basis for such
jurisdiction. Unless their existing state statutes can be broadly construed to
permit jurisdiction based solely on a contract clause, these states should
follow the McRae reasoning. Until their state legislatures enact appropriate
legislation, courts in these states should refuse to assert personal jurisdiction where the sole basis is a forum selection clause.'77
This right of each state to define and limit the types of personal jurisdiction waivers it will recognize has important implications in the wake of
Carnival Cruise.7 ' In Carnival Cruise, the Supreme Court enforced a

forum selection clause in a standard consumer form contract based on
federal common law.'79 The federal common law adopted by the Court
has been roundly criticized as anticonsumer.' ° Because Carnival Cruise
was an admiralty jurisdiction case, the Court's federal common law is not
binding on state courts generally. 8 '
An individual state can choose not to follow Carnival Cruise by simply developing state law which disfavors enforcement of forum selection
clauses in consumer contracts. One way a state might accomplish this is
by enacting legislation which limits recognition of personal jurisdiction

waivers in consumer contracts. This is precisely what many states have
done by recently enacting Uniform Commercial Code section 2A-106,
which applies to leases of goods.' Section 2A-106(2) states: "If the ju-

did not intend jurisdiction in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 to extend to the limits of due process).
A few states, such as Arizona, California, Wyoming, and Rhode Island, have statutes which
simply extend their courts' jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by the U.S. Constitution. E.g.,
ARIz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33
(1985); WYo. STAT. § 5-1-107 (1992). These states can therefore authorize personal jurisdiction based
solely on forum selection clauses because contractual waiver is constitutionally permissible. See supra
notes 135-61.
176. E.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Weir, 517 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (App. Div. 1987);
Baldwin v. Heinold Commodities, 363 N.W.2d 191 (S.D. 1985) (noting that a forum selection clause
confers personal jurisdiction regardless of whether the state long-arm statute otherwise grants it).
177. The general assumption is that a state can only assert personal jurisdiction to the extent authorized by state statute, as opposed to court rules or judge-made law; but this approach is not mandated by anything external to the state, so long as the Due Process Clause is not contravened. A state
could decide to establish personal jurisdiction authority by court rule. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P.
4.2(a); TEx. R. Civ. P. 108. Theoretically, a state could do so solely by court-made law. Most states
do not, however, use this route and rely instead on state statutes as their sole basis for personal jurisdiction. See CASAD. supra note 116, at app. E (surveying long-arm statutes state by state).
178. 111 S. Ct. at 1522.
179. Id.
180. See supra note 97.
181. See Heiser, FederalCouts, supra note 2. at 553.
182. The National Conference for Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
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dicial forum chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is a forum that
would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee, the choice is not
enforceable."' 83 As was the McRae court's restrictive interpretation of
the Florida long-arm statute, a state's adoption of section 2A-106(2) is a
valid exercise of the state's authority to statutorily define its courts' personal jurisdiction. In order to ameliorate the anticonsumer common law
trend started by Carnival Cruise, many states will undoubtedly enact
enforceU.C.C. § 2A-106(2) as well as other similar legislation restricting
84
ment of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts.1

Institute presented U.C.C. Art. 2A, which governs leases of personal property, in 1987. Since then, at
least 40 states have adopted Article 2A (including § 2A-106(2)) as their state law. See. e.g., U.C.C.
§ 2A-106 (1991). If Article 2A receives the same reception as the other articles of the U.C.C.. nearly
all states will likely adopt it in the near future. See generally Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 957 (1988) (discussing Article 2A).
183. U.C.C. § 2A-106(2) (1991). The official comment to § 2A-106(2) explains its purpose as
follows:
Subsection (2) prevents enforcement of potentially abusive jurisdictional consent clauses in
consumer leases. By using the term judicial forum, this section does not limit selection of a
nonjudicial forum, such as arbitration. This section has no effect on choice of forum clauses
in leases that are not consumer leases: such clauses are, as a matter of current law, "prima
facie valid". The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
Id. § 2A-106 cmt.
184. The most likely cases involving a forum selection clause in a consumer contract are ones
commenced by a retail company against a defendant consumer for breach of contract (e.g., default in
installment payments). In such litigation, a state statute restricting contractual personal jurisdiction
waivers, such as U.C.C. § 2A-106(2), would provide some protection to consumers in interstate consumer transactions. However, if a state court would otherwise have personal jurisdiction over a defendant consumer, then the consumer could be sued there regardless of the state's position on enforcement of forum selection clauses generally or specifically as to consumers. Cf. Burnham v. Superior
Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (allowing jurisdiction when a party is served a summons within the
forum state).
Less typical are cases where the consumer is the plaintiff, perhaps suing the defendant company for not adequately performing the contract or, as in Carnival Cruise, for injuries due to tortious
conduct arising out of the contractual relationship. See Carnival Cruise, I I S. Ct. at 1524-25. State
statutes designed to limit personal jurisdiction waivers by consumers will not prevent enforcement of a
forum selection clause here because such statutes only apply to consumers who are defendants. A state
which wishes to preclude enforcement of forum selection clauses when a consumer is the plaintiff
must adopt a different approach.
One approach is simply to prohibit enforcement of all forum selection clauses in consumer
contracts. Because Bremen and Carnival Cruise are not binding on the states generally, each state is
free to adopt such a protective consumer policy. Cf The Lotawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75
(1874) (noting that the uniform federal common law governing admiralty and maritime law is not
binding on the states). Indeed, as discussed previously, a state is under no obligation to adopt a policy
which enforces any forum selection clauses whether in a consumer or commercial contract. See supra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
A more circuitous and less comprehensive approach is to adopt a state "door-closing" statute
which prohibits a nonresident plaintiff from maintaining an action against a foreign corporation when
the cause of action arises outside of the forum state. E.g.. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-150 (Law. Co-op
1977). Such door-closing statutes are viewed as limiting the state courts' subject matter jurisdiction
and consequently are not waivable by the parties. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Unarco Indus., 297 S.E.2d
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In summary, the Due Process Clause does not preclude a state from
establishing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely
on a forum selection clause. This is so because the due process individual
liberty interest is waivable by a defendant.'85 Waiver in advance through
a contractual forum selection clause does not violate due process so long
as the clause is valid under general contract principles.
A problem does arise in those states which do not extend personal
jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent permitted by due process but
instead limit their courts' jurisdictional reach to a set of specific statutorily
defined circumstances. 86 A court in such a state should not assert per-

sonal jurisdiction over, a nonresident defendant where the only basis is a
contractual forum selection clause; there must also be some independent
statutory basis for the court's assertion of jurisdiction. 87
B. Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens
A second major issue in state courts concerns the interplay between
forum selection clauses and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This
issue arises when a plaintiff has filed an action in a state court designated
by a contractual forum selection clause, and the defendant then seeks

dismissal based on forum non conveniens.'t The court must determine
638 (S.C. 1982) (holding that lower court properly dismissed an action for subject matter jurisdiction
where the claim fell within door-closing statute); Eagle v. Global Assocs., 356 S.E.2d 417, 419 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that South Carolina's door-closing statute rendered any action within the
statute's scope absolutely void).
A forum selection clause which forces a consumer to sue in a state in contravention of such a
door-closing statute could not be enforced because the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction
by consent. See supra note 159. Such state statutes may even preclude diversity jurisdiction in federal
court. See, e.g., Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 739 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that
federal district court lacked diversity jurisdiction because South Carolina lacked jurisdiction pursuant
to a door-closing statute). However, existing door-closing statutes apply to foreign corporations. not to
ones created under the laws of the forum state. 9.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
185. See supra text accompanying note 138.
186. See supra text accompanying note 175.
187. A court in another state should not enforce a judgment obtained without such an independent
statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. Recently in Loyd & Ring's Wholesale Nursery v. Lang &
Woodley Landscaping & Garden Ctr., 431 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993), for example, the court
relying on McCrae held that a South Carolina court should not give full faith and credit to a Florida
default judgment whose only basis for personal jurisdiction in Florida was a forum selection clause.
188. An example is where a California company negotiates a lease with a New York company for
heavy equipment to be used in New York. The lease specifies California state courts as the exclusive
forum to resolve any disputes regarding the lease. The equipment breaks down once transported to
New York and the New York lessee refuses to pay anything more on the lease. The California lessor
then sues in California Superior Court and properly obtains personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The New York defendant then moves to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, on the grounds that
New York is far more convenient for witnesses and parties. The California court applies California
state law to the action, based on choice of law principles. California law enforces forum selection
clauses, basically adopting the Bremen doctrine. Should the California court consider the motion to
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whether the defendant's motion is precluded by the clause.'89 If not precluded, the court must then determine what effect the clause has on the
court's determination of whether to grant the dismissal. The answers to
these questions are relatively simple once the doctrine of forum non conveniens is examined more closely.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction if the forum chosen by the plaintiff is a seriously
inconvenient place to conduct the litigation."9° The doctrine varies somewhat from state to state, but most states adopt an approach similar to that
set forth by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.9' The doctrine may apply when the forum chosen by the plaintiff has proper jurisdiction over the claim and parties. The defendant seeks dismissal of the
action not because jurisdiction is lacking but because there is an alternative forum in another state which also has jurisdiction and, in addition, is
far more convenient.' The determination of the motion is typically addressed to the court's93 discretion and can only be overturned on appeal for
abuse of discretion.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Gilbert is fairly typical of the doctrine adopted in most states. 94 A
court, in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens, must consider a variety of factors. These factors include the
private interests of the litigants and the various public interests associated

dismiss, or should it simply deny it based on the forum selection clause? If it does consider the motion, what weight should the court give the forum selection clause?
189. Here is a situation where the nature of the forum selection clause is important. A clause
which designates a specific state's courts as the exclusive forum to resolve contract related disputes
presents the most difficult forum non conveniens issue. A clause which simply consents to suit in one
state, but does not preclude suit in others, merely presents the same issues as in any typical forum non
conveniens determination. See, e.g., Carvel Corp. v. Ross Distribution, 524 N.Y.S.2d 469. 470 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988) (holding that the forum non conveniens doctrine could still be applied because defendants had not consented to New York as the only forum, but merely as a permissible forum).
190. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
191. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
192. Id. at 506-09; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-56 (1981) (stating that
convenience is "the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry").
193. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
194. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 831-40 (1985); infra note 198. Gilbert dealt with forum non conveniens in
federal courts; the Court's holding was not directly binding on state courts. Most states did, however.
adopt the two-step doctrine set forth in Gilbert. See infra note 198. Ironically, Gilbert's federal common law doctrine is no longer used in domestic federal court litigation because it has been codified
and replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 375 U.S. 71 (1963) (using § 1404(a)). The federal common law doctrine is still applicable to
international litigation where the alternative forum is not in the United States, e.g., Piper Aircraft. 454
U.S. at 253-54, and in rare cases where the alternative forum is a state court, e.g., Hammond N.
Assocs. v. ABO Fin. Servs., 708 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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with the litigation. 95 The private interests identified in Gilbert include
such factors as:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; [the] availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [the] possibility of [a]
view of premises [where relevant]; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 96
The public interest factors identified in Gilbert include: "Administrative
difficulties ... for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers
instead of being handled at its origin[; the burden of jury duty] imposed
upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation[;] ... [the] local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home"; and the appropriateness of courts applying substantive law with
which they are familiar. 97
Nearly all states, by statute or case law, have incorporated Gilbert's
private and public interest factors into their forum non conveniens doctrine. 9 None of these public interest factors, and only some of the private interest factors, have anything to do with the convenience of the
parties. Instead these factors deal generally with concerns external to the
plaintiff's or defendant's desire to litigate in a specific forum. Most of
these factors deal with convenience in the broadest sense of the word, i.e.,
the convenience of witnesses, jurors, judges, and state judicial systems, as
well as of the parties.'
In contrast, a forum selection clause deals only with the negotiated
convenience of the parties to the contract. The parties bargained for a
designated forum as a way of allocating and controlling litigation inconveniences to each party and determining contract price. Each party to the

195. Gilbert,330 U.S. at 508-09.
196. Id. at 508.
197. Id. at 508-09.
198. ALA. CODE § 6-5-430 (1993); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 327 (McKinney 1990); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5322(e) (1981); Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991); Goodwine v. Superior
Court, 407 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965); Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna, Casualty & Surety, Co., 562 A.2d 15
(Conn. 1989); Parvin v. Kaufmann, 236 A.2d 425 (Del. 1967); Bland v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 506
N.E.2d 1291 (Ill. 1987); MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978); Varkonyi v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao A.R.G., 239 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1968); Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 519
N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1988); Zurick v. Inman. 426 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1968). For citations to additional
state court cases, see CASAD. supra note 116, §1.04, at 1-26 to 1-42.
199. For example, California courts have identified 25 factors which should be considered in determining the applicability of forum non conveniens. E.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 208
Cal. Rptr. 627, 631 n.2 (Ct. App. 1984); Great N. Ry. v. Superior Court. 90 Cal. Rptr. 461. 466-67
(Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
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contract therefore generally waives its right to unfettered choice of forum
if litigation should arise. The precise scope of what each party waives,
however, is not as clear.
As discussed previously, a party can waive the individual liberty interest which constitutes its due process personal jurisdiction right." Similarly, a party can waive whatever else it has the power to contractually
waive. This would clearly include each side's respective concern for its
own personal convenience as parties if litigation should arise from the
contractual relationship. However, the parties certainly have no power to
waive the litigation convenience concerns of those not a party to the contract. Using forum non conveniens terminology, the parties lack authority
to contractually reallocate the various public interest factors, or those
private ones of third parties not related to the contract.
Consequently, the existence of a contract provision designating one
state's courts as the exclusive forum should not prevent the defendant
from seeking dismissal based on forum non conveniens. ° ' A forum selection clause cannot preclude this motion, even though the effect of the
motion may be to dismiss the case from the contractually mandated forum. 2 The parties to a contract simply have no power to waive interests

200. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
201. An interesting issue does exist where the contract contains not only an exclusive forum selection clause but also an express agreement not to raise a motion for transfer or dismissal based on the
inconvenience of the designated forum. Forum non conveniens motions are generally raised by defendants. and therefore brought to a court's attention by the parties. A clause specifically waiving this
right to bring the motion would probably not be enforced because of the public interest factors, but
this issue can be avoided by the court raising forum non conveniens on its own motion. Most states
authorize their courts to raise the doctrine sua sponte, as is recognized in Gilbert. See, e.g., Country
Pride Foods v. Medina & Medina, 648 S.W.2d 485 (Ark. 1983) Bongards' Creameries v. Alfa-Laval.
Inc.. 339 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1983); List v. List, 540 A.2d 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). Contra VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, 519 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1988) (stating that under CPLR
327(a), a court does not have authority to invoke forum non conveniens on its own motion). A defendant could certainly urge the court to consider the doctrine sua sponte, even if the contract precludes
the defendant itself from actually moving for dismissal.
202. Despite some confusion about the relationship between forum selection clauses and forum
non conveniens, see. e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2. at 326, an increasing number of state courts have
concluded that forum selection clauses cannot preclude such motions. See, e.g., Appalachian hIs.. 208
Cal. Rptr. at 633 (holding that various public interest factors cannot be automatically outweighed by
the existence of a purely private agreement); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co..
555 N.E.2d 214, 218-19 (Mass. 1990) (commenting that a forum selection clause cannot bar the use of
forum non conveniens because it involves public as well as private interests); Sarieddine v. Moussa.
820 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Contra Concord Assets Fin. Corp. v. Radebaugh. 568
N.Y.S.2d 950. 952 (App. Div. 1991) (stating that a forum non conveniens motion was misplaced because the contract contained a New York forum selection clause).
[A] trial court is not bound by the forum selection clause agreement if the interests of the
witness and of the public strongly favor transferring the case to another forum. While the
forum selection clause might confer personal jurisdiction, we hold that it does not preclude
consideration of a motion to dismiss on the theory of forum non conveniens.
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possessed not by them, but by the public or by third parties.
A more difficult question remains, however, as to the weight a court
should give to a forum selection clause when considering a forum non
conveniens motion. The answer to this question is complicated by the fact
that different states have different doctrines regarding such motions, but a
general answer is possible. The existence of a forum selection clause
should remove the individual parties' convenience or inconvenience from
the court's consideration of the various private and public interest factors."0 3 The court should assume that the bargained-for forum selection
clause exists as the result of the parties' desire to place certainty of forum
on a higher level than the parties' personal convenience interests relative
to litigation. 4 The parties should be viewed as having given up their
respective private interests for the most convenient forum in the event of
litigation in exchange for whatever benefits each obtained in return for the
concession.' °5
Courts may find it difficult to determine which of the other forum non
conveniens factors are properly waivable by the parties to a contract and
those which cannot be waived. Clearly, the various public interest factors

are not subject to contractual waiver. By contrast, waivable factors would
likely include any notions of inconvenience to the parties themselves in
conducting the litigation, such as the cost of attorneys, discovery, and

transporting parties or documents to trial."° More difficult to categorize

Sarieddine. 820 S.W.2d at 839 (citation omitted).
203. This, of course, assumes that the relevant state law does not render the forum selection clause
per se void as against public policy, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text; nor invalid under
basic contract principles such as fraud, overreaching, or unequal bargaining power. See supra note 18.
204. The intent behind the forum selection clause may be not only certainty of forum, but perhaps
the quid pro quo for entering into a contract. Using the example of the California lessor and the New
York lessee, supra note 188, the lessor may have been unwilling to even enter into the lease agreement with a New York customer unless the designated forum was Califomia. Without the clause, the
California lessor may have decided that it is hot worth doing business with a New York party or may
have demanded a higher rental amount.
205. See In re Hilliard. 533 N.E.2d 543, 545 (III. App. Ct. 1989). In Hilliard,for example, the
parties agreed that Illinois would be the exclusive forum for any postdissolution decree proceedings.
Id. at 544. The plaintiff resided in Illinois at the time of this agreement, but defendant had already
moved to California. Id. at 544-45. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a petition to modify the dissolution
judgment in an Illinois court, and the defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id. at 544. The trial court denied the motion based on the parties' agreement, and the appellate
court affirmed, stating, "If both parties freely entered into the agreement contemplating such inconvenience should there be a dispute, one party cannot successfully argue inconvenience as a reason for
rendering the forum clause unenforceable." Id. at 545.
206. See, e.g., Furda v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Ct. App. 1984). This is not inconsistent with that part of Bremen which states that a forum selection clause will not be enforced if the
designated forum is so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the defendant "will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. The Bremen Court limited this
concept to rare instances where the inconvenience of the particular controversy was unforeseen by the
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would be the convenience of witnesses. Decisions to grant forum non
conveniens motions often turn on this factor. 27
In many contexts, the convenience of the witnesses factor is really
only a part of the overall private convenience concerns of each party. Such
is the case, for example, where the witnesses are employees of the party
calling them or are experts retained by the party.2"' Whenever a party
simply complains that the designated forum will result in greater expense
in bringing its witnesses to trial, the proper response is that this is a private convenience factor bargained away in the contract.
Nevertheless, there may be cases where a party is unable to compel
key witnesses to attend trial in the designated forum, not because of expense, but because of lack of subpoena power. Many courts simply dismiss this factor entirely by ruling that depositions can be taken of witnesses and that the moving party waived the right to live testimony from these
witnesses when it agreed to the forum selection clause.2 9 Other courts

parties at the time of the contract. Id. at 16-18. This Bremen statement was made in the context of an
international commercial admiralty dispute. See id. at 2. It is difficult to see how this "denial-of-dayin-court" concept would ever apply to interstate commercial disputes. See supra note 88.
In Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1976), for example.
the California Supreme Court enforced a clause under which each contracting party, one from California and the other from Pennsylvania, agreed to bring an action only in the other's home state. Id. at
1206. The Smith court found that "both [parties] reasonably [could] be held to have contemplated in
negotiating their agreement the additional expense and inconvenience attendant on the litigation of
their respective claims in a distant forum: such matters are inherent in a reciprocal clause of this type."
Id. at 1209.
207. Generally speaking, these motions are usually decided by reference to the convenience of
parties and witnesses, and not on the various other private and public factors. See. e.g.. Gilbert. 330
U.S. at 508; Houk v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 613 F. Supp. 923. 928 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (noting that the
convenience of witnesses is said to be a primary, if not the most important. factor); Cambridge Filter
Corp. v. International Filter Co.. 548 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (D. Nev. 1982) (stating that a primary concern is the convenience of witnesses); Saminsky v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 373 F. Supp. 257, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (commenting that the most significant factor is the convenience of party and nonparty
witnesses); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3849, 3851 (West
1976 & Supp. 1993) (citing cases emphasizing convenience of witnesses). Because a forum selection
clause removes the parties' private convenience interests from consideration, a court's main focus will
likely be on the convenience of witnesses factor.
208. See, e.g., Bland v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 506 N.E.2d 1291, 1296 (I11.1987) (stating that a party
should not frustrate forum choice by picking an expert from an inconvenient location); Safeway Stores
v. Martin, 530 P.2d 131, 133 (Okla. 1974) ("ITihe residence or inconvenience of possible medical
witnesses is not a determinative factor. Such witnesses are usually selected for their reputation and
special knowledge without regard to their residences."): Norman v. Norfolk & W. Ry.. 323 A.2d 850,
855-56 (Pa. 1974) ("lEixperts are selected by the parties and are available virtually anywhere in the
United States. To give controlling weight to this factor would allow any [party] to easily circumvent
the forum non conveniens doctrine by choosing an expert in an inconvenient forum.").
209. See, e.g., Smith, 551 P.2d at 1209-10 (enforcing a forum selection clause designating a Pennsylvania forum, despite defendant's forum non conveniens motion, although plaintiff's witnesses resided in California); Calanca v. D. & S. Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Prudential
Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97. 99-100 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (holding a forum selection
clause reasonable despite the fact that one party's witnesses were not able to appear personally in the
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have stressed the importance of live testimony as an aid to the jury or
judge as factfinder, particularly when credibility of that witness was a key
issue. 2 ° These latter courts characterize this interest as a public one, not
waivable by the parties to the contract. 1'
The better approach would seem to be that the convenience of witnesses factor should result in dismissal from a contractually mandated
forum only in rare cases. An example would be where the designated
forum is inconvenient to all witnesses for both sides, presumably because
the specific dispute was unforeseen by the parties at the time of contract."2 Otherwise, this factor should be viewed as a private one, foreseeable at the time of contract. The right to present live testimony at trial
is then simply another private right bargained away when the forum selection clause was negotiated." 3

designated forum, because the witness' evidence could be presented by deposition and the witness'
credibility was not an important aspect of the information elicited); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v.
Met-Fab Indus., 320 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1982) (enforcing a forum selection clause despite inconvenience to a party's witnesses because their testimony could be presented by deposition without
disadvantage); Arthur Young & Co. v. Leong, 383 N.Y.S.2d 618. 619 (App. Div.) (stating that the
parties, by agreeing to a forum, "obviated considerations of inconvenience to a party or a witness"),
appeal dismissed, 390 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1976).
210. See Gilbert,330 U.S. at 501. The Supreme Court in Gilbert observed that "to fix the place of
trial at a point where litigants cannot compel personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases
on deposition. is to create a condition not satisfactory to [the] court, jury or most litigants." Id. at 511.
More recent federal court decisions have likewise expressed disfavor with use of depositions, even
videotape depositions, as a substitute for the ability to compel live testimony. E.g., Rouse Woodstock.
Inc. v. Surety Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (N.D. II1. 1986) (stating that although
videotape depositions mitigate the need, live testimony of an essential witness is of greater importance
in cases of fraud where the result may turn on the credibility of the witness); Paul v. International
Precious Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174, 179 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (noting that in view of the importance
of credibility determinations of a key fraud witness, testimony presented through videotape deposition
is particularly unappealing). But see infra note 213 (discussing videotape depositions).
211. See, e.g., Rouse Woodstock, 630 F. Supp. at 1004.
212. The action may be a tort action, for example, and all the witnesses may be in a state other
than that of the designated forum. See, e.g., Standard Office Sys. v. Ricoh Corp., 742 F. Supp. 534.
537-38 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
213. Even in the absence of a forum selection clause, the importance of "compulsory process" for
witnesses has greatly diminished in the forum non conveniens calculus due to videotape depositions.
In Picketts v. International Playtex, 576 A.2d 518. 522-23 (Conn. 1990), for example, the trial court
granted a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens because several of the defendant's key witnesses were beyond the compulsory process of the forum. Id. at 522-23. The Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it found this private interest factor
sufficient to overcome plaintiff's choice of forum. Id. at 529.
The Connecticut Supreme Court criticized the trial court for losing sight of modern technological innovations since the United States Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Gilbert, noting that, "the
advent of the videotaped deposition [has] greatly transformed the meaning of compulsory process in a
forum non conveniens calculus. 'Videotaped depositions frequently make corporeal transportation of
foreign witnesses unnecessary.' " Id. (quoting Rudetsky v. O'Dowd, 660 F. Supp. 341. 347-48
(E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
Other courts have taken a similarly favorable view of videotape depositions. E.g., Monsanto
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Generally speaking, a state court should remove these private convenience factors (of parties and witnesses) from its forum non conveniens
deliberations. The court should assume that the defendant agreed to waive
the right to assert these private interests as part of the contractual bargain.2 4 This is the approach taken by many state courts confronted with
this issue.215 Other state courts give the contractually mandated choice of
forum less weight and instead balance the parties' various interests as if
the clause did not exist." 6 This latter approach seems clearly wrong and
ignores the bargained-for trade-offs made by the parties to the contract.
This approach gives the defendant an unwarranted double benefit: The
contract benefits obtained in exchange for agreeing to the forum selection
clause plus the benefit of the undiminished power to challenge the designated forum through forum non conveniens.
The net effect is that dismissal from a contractually mandated forum
for forum non conveniens should be extremely rare. Even where there is
no forum selection clause, "there is ordinarily a strong presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, which may be overcome only
when the private and public interest factors clearly point towards trial in
'
the alternative forum."217
Where a mandatory clause does exist, the two
most important factors--convenience of the parties and witnesses-are
essentially removed from the court's consideration." 8 A court can still

Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 559 A.2d 1301 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988): see also Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Monsanto Co.. 692 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D. Conn. 1988) ("The litigants here are corporations which
do business nationwide and face litigation in many states .... [Alir travel, express mail, electronic
data transmission, and videotaped depositions are part of the normal course of business for companies
such as these."); Brinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v. Pacific Erectors, 690 F. Supp. 891. 896 n.6
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (noting that although the defendant may prefer live testimony of essential witnesses,
"the use of video depositions is often quite effective with juries"); Somerville v. Major Exploration.
576 F. Supp. 902, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that while deposition testimony is generally unsatisfactory in fraud cases where credibility takes on added importance, the use of videotape depositions can
make demeanor evidence available to a jury even when witnesses are not physically present at trial);
Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (commenting that videotaped despositions allow the jury to assess an absent witness' demeanor).
214. See supra notes 153-61. This. again, assumes the clause is otherwise valid under contract
formation principles. See supra note 18.
215. See, e.g., Cal-State Business Prods. & Servs. v. Ricoh, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 427 (Ct. App.
1993); Rokeby-Johnson v. Kentucky Agric. Energy Corp., 489 N.Y.S.2d 69. 73-74 (App. Div. 1985).
Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.. 555 N.E.2d 214 (Mass. 1990) (upholding a
service of suit clause due to parties' contractual agreement despite a convenience objection).
216. See, e.g., Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa
1982); Package Express Ctr. v. Snider Foods, 788 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
217. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255. Moreover, as stated in Gilbert, "unless the balance [of interests] is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. Most states have adopted this deferential view of the plaintiff's choice of
forum. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. However, the plaintiff's choice deserves less deference when the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum state. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256.
218. A court should remove these private convenience interests from consideration when the fo-
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fully consider the various other interest factors, mostly public, before
ruling on the motion," 9 but the expected result is that very few of these
motions would be granted.2 0
In summary, the existence of a mandatory forum selection clause
should not preclude the contractually designated state court from entertaining a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. However, a valid
forum selection clause should remove the most important factors from the
court's calculus and, therefore, should usually result in denial of the motion. The next question, discussed in the second installment of this article
is whether a forum selection clause should receive the same treatment in
similar motions in federal court."2

rum selection clause is valid. If not valid for sohme reason, then the court's forum non conveniens
deliberation would ignore the clause. But if the clause is enforceable and mandatory, the deference
normally given the plaintiff's choice of forum plus the impact of the clause on the private convenience
interests should almost certainly result in a denial of the motion.
219. See supra text accompanying note 197. One public interest factor that receives substantial
weight, even where a forum selection clause is present, is the pendency of a prior filed action involving the same issues and parties which is capable of ensuring prompt and complete justice. See, e.g.,
Monsanto, 559 A.2d at 1308 ("Delaware law practically requires the existence of another pending action, in an appropriate forum, for a party to succeed on a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens."); Stankunas v. Stankunas, 582 A.2d 280, 281-82 (N.H. 1990). Another such factor is the
prevention of court congestion due to the trial of multiple cases involving complex foreign causes of
action. E.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991).
220. A related, although relatively minor, issue arises in an intrastate setting. Some contracts designate a specific county within a state as the exclusive venue for litigation. When suit is filed in the
contractually designated county, a defendant may seek to transfer the case to a different county within
the state. Conversely, when suit is initiated in another county, the defendant may seek to enforce the
forum selection clause by an intrastate motion to transfer.
There is little question that parties can waive the right to object to venue within a state's system. But whether a contractual venue designation clause will automatically preclude a motion to transfer to another county depends on the state's transfer of venue doctrine. If that doctrine embodies an
intrastate notion of forum non conveniens such that the court must consider both private and public
interests, the parties can contractually waive only their respective private interests. Cf. supra notes
200-02 and accompanying text. If, however, a state's doctrine encompasses only private rights regarding venue, the forum selection clause may be conclusive. See, e.g., Bechtel Civil & Minerals v. South
Carolina Basin Irrigation Dist., 752 P.2d 395, 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
A surprising number of courts, however, take the opposite view of intrastate venue and construe state venue statutes as embodying public policy. These courts hold intrastate clauses that designate an exclusive county as unenforceable if they attempt to fix venue in contravention of their state's
statutory venue provisions. E.g., Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n. 563 N.E.2d 465; 486
(111.1990) (holding that a forum selection clause designating a county contravenes policy underlying
Illinois' general venue statute, and is therefore invalid); see also Perkins v. CCH Computax, 423
S.E.2d 780. 782 (N.C. 1992) (distinguishing intrastate venue clauses, which contravene state venue
statutes, from interstate forum selection clauses which are not governed by any state statute); Rose v.
Etling, 467 P.2d 633 (Or. 1970) (en banc) (invalidating a contractual attempt to place venue in a particular county). Using Bremen terminology, these courts invalidated intrastate clauses because they
violated public policy as expressed in a state venue statute. Cf. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (stating that a
forum selection clause should not be enforced when it would violate a state statute).
221. Heiser, FederalCourts, supra note 2, at 553.
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